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MAKING ROOM: WHY INCLUSIONARY ZONING IS
PERMISSIBLE UNDER WASHINGTON’S TAX
PREEMPTION STATUTE AND TAKINGS FRAMEWORK
Josephine L. Ennis
Abstract: Inclusionary zoning ordinances, which typically require developers to set aside
a percentage of new residential units for low and moderate income households, are a popular
mechanism for ensuring the development of affordable housing in many communities.
Washington State jurisdictions have been slow to introduce inclusionary zoning—particularly
mandatory set-asides—perhaps because of the legal battles they would face. The Washington
State Supreme Court previously relied on RCW 82.02.020 (the “tax preemption statute”) to
1
invalidate a low-income housing ordinance in San Telmo Associates v. City of Seattle and in
2
R/L Associates, Inc. v. City of Seattle. Washington courts have also relied on a unique and
complex takings analysis to invalidate low-income housing and manufactured housing laws
on grounds that they constituted a “taking” of private property or a violation of substantive
due process under the U.S. Constitution, or in some cases, under the Washington State
Constitution. This Comment argues that inclusionary zoning is authorized by RCW
3
36.70A.540, the Affordable Housing Incentive Programs Act, which expressly amended the
tax preemption statute and permits both voluntary and mandatory inclusionary zoning
programs. This Comment explores the differences between the federal and Washington
takings analyses and argues that the Washington State Supreme Court should abandon its
4
unique tests in favor of the federal approach as articulated in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
Finally, this Comment explains why mandatory set-asides are constitutional under both
federal and Washington takings law.

INTRODUCTION
Nationwide there is an acute shortage of affordable housing.5 A
number of jurisdictions have responded to the problem by enacting
inclusionary zoning ordinances, which require developers to set aside a
percentage of housing units in new residential developments for lowincome households.6 The two most popular inclusionary zoning models
1. 108 Wash. 2d 20, 735 P.2d 673 (1987).
2. 113 Wash. 2d 402, 780 P.2d 838 (1989).
3. Affordable Housing Incentive Programs Act, ch. 149, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 704 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.540 (2012)).
4. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
5. In 2009, more than half of American renters lived in unaffordable housing. Most Renters Live
in Unaffordable Housing, New Census Data Show, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION
(Sept. 29, 2010), http://nlihc.org/press/releases/2137. “Unaffordable” is defined as spending more
than 30% of household income on housing. Id.
6. See Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, Comment, In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: Successfully
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are: (1) mandatory set-aside programs, in which a minimum percentage
of units in new residential developments must be offered at affordable
rates; and (2) voluntary incentive zoning programs, where developers are
rewarded with extra density allowances (or other incentives) when they
include affordable housing in developments.7 Many believe that
inclusionary zoning programs are especially helpful for creating mixedincome neighborhoods in areas where rapid growth may drive out
existing low-income tenants.8
Washington jurisdictions have been reluctant to adopt affordable
housing programs, perhaps due to a number of successful legal
challenges by developers.9 However, in 2006, the Washington State
Legislature responded to the pressing housing needs of the state and
passed legislation authorizing cities and counties to adopt “affordable
housing incentive programs.”10 Under the Affordable Housing Incentive
Program Act (AHIPA), local governments may incentivize low-income
housing development by offering density bonuses, height and bulk
bonuses, fee waivers or exemptions, parking reductions, expedited
permitting, or other incentives.11 As of May 2012, at least three
Washington communities have adopted mandatory set-asides,12 and
Creating Affordable Housing, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 971, 977 (2002) (explaining that Fairfax County
Virginia adopted the first inclusionary zoning program in 1971, followed shortly thereafter by
Montgomery County, Maryland). Since the 1970s, California has taken the lead in implementing
inclusionary zoning programs, with 170 Californian cities and counties—approximately one-third of
California jurisdictions—adopting such ordinances as of 2006. NON-PROFIT HOUS. ASS’N OF N.
CAL., AFFORDABLE BY CHOICE: TRENDS IN CALIFORNIA INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS
(2007), available at http://calruralhousing.org/drupal/sites/default/files/SampleIHReport.pdf.
7. TIM IGLESIAS & ROCHELLE E. LENTO, THE LEGAL GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING
DEVELOPMENT 99–101 (2d ed. 2011). See generally DOUGLAS R. PORTER, INCLUSIONARY ZONING
FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING (2004). See also Brian R. Lerman, Note, Mandatory Inclusionary
Zoning—The Answer to the Affordable Housing Problem, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 383 (2006)
(comparing East coast and West coast mandatory set-aside programs in the United States).
8. See, e.g., Kautz, supra note 6; Cecily T. Talbert & Nadia L. Costa, Current Issues in
Inclusionary Zoning, 36 URB. LAW. 557 (2004).
9. See Cristina Jorgenson, Duncan Greene & Megan Nelson, Affordable Housing Incentive
Programs Under HB 2984: Bonus or Burden?, REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST (Wash. State Bar
Ass’n, Wash.), Winter 2007-2008, at 2.
10. H.B. 2984, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.540
(2012)).
11. Affordable Housing Incentive Programs Act, ch. 149, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 704 (codified
at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.540(1)(a)(i)–(vi) (2012)).
12. See FEDERAL WAY, WASH., ZONING CODE § 19.110.010 (2013) (multifamily projects over 25
units must provide affordable units, and may then build bonus units); KIRKLAND, WASH., MUN.
CODE § 23.112 (2013) (all developments with over four units and located in certain zones must
provide some affordable units); REDMOND, WASH., ZONING CODE § 21.20 (2013) (developments of
over 10 units in specified zones must provide affordable units, and may then build bonus units).
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another nine have adopted some form of voluntary incentive zoning
program.13
The City of Seattle enacted its own voluntary incentive zoning
program in 2008,14 but because incentive zoning has produced far fewer
affordable units than hoped for, housing advocates have called for a
mandatory program that applies to all new residential developments.15 In
negotiations over the rezone of the rapidly developing South Lake Union
neighborhood, Seattle City Council members have explored the idea of
revising the City’s incentive zoning policy to produce more affordable
housing.16 If the City of Seattle adopts a mandatory set-aside program, it
is very likely to face a legal challenge from the local real estate
community.17 This Comment reviews the legal framework that a
Washington court would use when considering such a challenge and
argues that mandatory set-asides are permissible on both statutory and
constitutional grounds.
Washington courts have relied on RCW 82.02.02018 (the “tax
preemption statute”) to strike down land set-aside mandates and
previous low-income housing ordinances promulgated by county and
city governments.19 The tax preemption statute prohibits local
governments from imposing certain types of development conditions or

13. Affordable Housing Ordinances/Flexible Provisions, MUN. RES. & SERVICES CENTER WASH.,
www.mrsc.org/subjects/planning/housing/ords.aspx (last updated May 2012) (cities with voluntary
programs include Marysville, Poulsbo, Shoreline, Snohomish, and Woodinville; counties include
King, Pierce, and San Juan).
14. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 122882 (Dec. 15, 2008) (codified at SEATTLE, WASH., SEATTLE
MUN. CODE § 23.58A (2013)).
15. See, e.g., Emily Alvarado, Zoning Matters, HOUSING DEV. CONSORTIUM (Jan. 30, 2013, 2:48
PM) http://wliha.org/blog/zoning-matters.
16. See Richard Conlin, Affordable Housing in South Lake Union: Careful Work Needed,
SEATTLE.GOV (Mar. 1, 2013), http://conlin.seattle.gov/2013/03/01/affordable-housing-in-southlake-union-careful-work-needed/; Bob Young, Council Signals 24-Story Towers by South Lake
Union Won’t Fly, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 2, 2013, at B1.
17. Washington State developers have successfully defeated efforts to impose housing-related
requirements on developers and landlords on a number of occasions. See, e.g., Manufactured Hous.
Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 13 P.3d 183 (2000); Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d
586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993); Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 318 (1992); Sintra,
Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra I), 119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765 (1992); R/L Assocs., Inc. v. City of
Seattle, 113 Wash. 2d 402, 780 P.2d 838 (1989); San Telmo Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 108 Wash.
2d 20, 735 P.2d 673 (1987).
18. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.020 (2012).
19. See Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wash. 2d 740, 49 P.3d 867 (2002)
(30% open-space set-aside for proposed subdivisions); R/L Assocs., Inc., 113 Wash. 2d 402, 780
P.2d 838 (tenant relocation assistance); San Telmo Assocs., 108 Wash. 2d 20, 735 P.2d 673
(required replacement housing or payments into fund for demolition of existing low-income units).
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charges on landowners.20 Because Washington courts have expressed a
preference for invalidating housing ordinances under RCW 82.02.020
rather than on constitutional grounds,21 the tax preemption statute is the
logical starting point for a court considering the validity of a mandatory
set-aside ordinance in Washington. Part I of this Comment discusses
how RCW 82.02.020 has been used to invalidate previous ordinances
and also introduces the AHIPA,22 which explicitly amended the tax
preemption statute to allow for “affordable housing incentive
programs.”23 Part II argues that AHIPA authorizes both mandatory and
optional inclusionary zoning programs. It further argues that because
AHIPA amended RCW 82.02.020, a mandatory set-aside program that
otherwise conforms to AHIPA is statutorily permissible in Washington.
In addition to a tax preemption challenge, a mandatory set-aside
program may be challenged on both state and federal constitutional
grounds. Nationally, inclusionary zoning ordinances have been attacked
as unconstitutional takings, or as violations of due process, with
divergent results in state courts.24 Federal courts have yet to engage in a
rigorous and comprehensive review of inclusionary zoning,25 although
some have applied elements of the takings analysis to inclusionary
zoning policies.26 Because a plaintiff in Washington could raise a federal
takings claim to challenge mandatory set-asides, Part III of this

20. See, e.g., R/L Assocs., Inc., 113 Wash. 2d at 407, 780 P.2d at 841.
21. See, e.g., Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc., 146 Wash. 2d at 752, 49 P.3d at 874.
22. Affordable Housing Incentive Programs Act, ch. 149, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 704 (codified
at WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.540 (2012)).
23. Id.
24. Compare Homebuilders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001) (rejecting developer’s takings and due process claims because ordinance advanced a
legitimate state interest, provided ample economic benefits to developers, and provided
administrative relief to those who demonstrated a lack of nexus or of a reasonable relationship under
the development exactions tests), and S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mt.
Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (holding that inclusionary zoning properly falls within the
police power and is neither a taking nor a substantive due process violation), with Bldg. Indus.
Ass’n of San Diego Cnty., Inc. v. City of San Diego, No. GIC817064, 2006 WL 1666822 (Cal.
Super. Ct. May 24, 2006) (finding ordinance facially unconstitutional because it did not provide for
a waiver if a developer could show an absence of a nexus or reasonable relationship between
development and need for low-income housing), and Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax Cnty. v. DeGroff
Enter., Inc., 198 S.E.2d 600 (Va. 1973) (ruling that inclusionary zoning violated the takings clause
of the Virginia Constitution and exceeded the authority granted by state enabling legislation).
25. Jerold S. Kayden, Inclusionary Zoning and the Constitution, NHC AFFORDABLE HOUSING
POL’Y REV., Jan. 2002, at 10.
26. See, e.g., Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th. Cir.
1991) (examining whether requiring commercial developers to pay into a low-income housing trust
fund was an unconstitutional exaction).
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Comment reviews the current state of federal takings law and briefly
explores how courts nationwide have applied federal takings law to
inclusionary zoning challenges. Additionally, in order to contrast
Washington’s approach, Part III describes how the U.S. Supreme Court
has abandoned its substantive due process approach in the land use
context.
The Washington State Supreme Court has provided heightened
protections to landowners by engaging in an idiosyncratic takings
analysis based on the Washington State Constitution27 and a unique
application of federal takings law.28 For this reason, an inclusionary
zoning ordinance in Washington may be subject to even greater scrutiny
than elsewhere in the country.29 Part IV of this Comment provides an
overview of Washington’s takings jurisprudence, while Part V discusses
the ongoing application of substantive due process law to land use
claims in Washington. Part VI argues that such an ordinance can survive
a takings challenge under the federal takings analysis so long as the
program requirements are not overly burdensome to landowners and still
allow developers a reasonable return on their investment. Additionally,
mandatory set-asides satisfy the development exactions criteria of
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission30 and Dolan v. City of Tigard31
so long as the implementing jurisdiction provides proper evidence
linking the construction of new residential development to the need for
additional low-income housing units. Finally, Part VII argues that a
mandatory set-aside ordinance should pass the takings and substantive
due process protections of Washington’s constitutional framework.
However, this Comment further argues that the Washington State
Supreme Court should abandon its unique analysis—particularly its
reliance on substantive due process—in favor of the federal takings
analysis articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lingle v. Chevron

27. See Manufactured Hous. Cmtys of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 359–60, 13 P.3d 183,
189–90 (2000).
28. See Roger D. Wynne, The Path Out of Washington’s Takings Quagmire: The Case for
Adopting the Federal Takings Analysis, 86 WASH. L. REV. 125, 151–52 (2011) (explaining
differences between the Washington and the federal analysis).
29. See id.
30. 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding land-use exaction a taking when government conditioned
permit to build a larger residence on beachfront property on the dedication of an easement for public
beach access).
31. 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (holding exaction a taking when government required dedication of
portion of property for a bicycle and pedestrian “greenway” before granting store a development
permit).
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U.S.A., Inc.32
I.

WASHINGTON COURTS HAVE RELIED ON
WASHINGTON’S TAX PREEMPTION STATUTE TO
INVALIDATE HOUSING PRESERVATION AND LAND SETASIDE ORDINANCES

RCW 82.02.020 protects developers from making payments as a
condition for development unless those payments are directly related to
impacts of the development or are otherwise authorized by the statute.33
In San Telmo Associates v. City of Seattle,34 and in R/L Associates, Inc.
v. City of Seattle,35 the Washington State Supreme Court invalidated a
low-income housing ordinance on the basis that the ordinance
constituted an impermissible tax.36 Subsequently, Washington courts
have adopted a strict interpretation of the tax preemption statute and
have invalidated even indirect charges on developments when the
charges do not explicitly fall within one of RCW 82.02.020’s
exceptions.37 As the cases below highlight, without an explicit
amendment to RCW 82.02.020, an inclusionary zoning ordinance would
be vulnerable to a tax preemption challenge.38 However, in 2006, the
drafters of the Affordable Housing Incentives Program Act (AHIPA)
explicitly amended RCW 82.02.020 to accommodate “incentive zoning”
programs.39 As discussed further in Part II, whether mandatory set-asides
are permissible under RCW 82.02.020 rests largely on the question of
whether AHIPA authorizes mandatory incentive zoning in addition to
purely voluntary programs.40

32. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.020 (2012).
34. 108 Wash. 2d 20, 735 P.2d 673 (1987).
35. 113 Wash. 2d 402, 780 P.2d 838 (1989).
36. See R/L Assocs., Inc., 113 Wash. 2d at 409, 780 P.2d at 842; San Telmo Assocs., 108 Wash.
2d at 24, 735 P.2d at 675.
37. See, e.g., Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wash. 2d 740, 49 P.3d 867
(2002); Citizens’ Alliance for Prop. Rights v. Sims, 145 Wash. App. 649, 187 P.3d 786 (2008), cert.
denied, 165 Wash. 2d 1030, 203 P.3d 378 (2009).
38. See infra Part I.A–B.
39. See Affordable Housing Incentive Programs Act, ch. 149, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 704
(codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.540 (2012)).
40. See infra Part V.
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The Washington State Supreme Court Relied on RCW 82.02.020 to
Strike Down Former Low-Income Housing Ordinances

Unless expressly provided elsewhere, RCW 82.02.020 preempts local
governments from imposing direct or indirect taxes, fees, or charges on
certain construction, development, and land division activities.41 RCW
82.02.020 permits local governments to require land dedications or
easements in proposed developments when such requirements are
“reasonably necessary as a direct result of [a] proposed development.”42
Finally, under RCW 82.02.050–.090, local governments may impose
certain mitigation measures, including impact fees, to offset costs
associated with a new development.43 A tax, fee, or charge imposed on a
development is invalid unless it falls within an exception specified in the
statute.44
The Washington State Supreme Court previously relied on the tax
preemption statute to invalidate a low-income housing ordinance as an
impermissible tax on landowners. In 1985, the City of Seattle enacted a
Housing Preservation Ordinance (HPO) to mitigate the loss of affordable
housing caused by redevelopment and changed use and to provide
relocation assistance to displaced residents.45 Under the HPO,
landowners planning to demolish or convert low-income housing units
were required to provide affected tenants with relocation assistance and
replace a percentage of the low income housing with other suitable
housing.46 The Washington State Supreme Court first invalidated the
HPO as an unauthorized tax in San Telmo Associates v. City of Seattle.47
Two years later, the court reaffirmed its holding in R/L Associates, Inc.
v. City of Seattle.48
In San Telmo, the Washington State Supreme Court applied a test set

41. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.020 (2012).
42. Id.
43. Id. §§ 82.02.050–.090.
44. R/L Assocs., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 113 Wash. 2d 402, 409, 780 P.2d 838, 842 (1989).
45. See San Telmo Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 108 Wash. 2d 20, 22, 735 P.2d 673, 673–74 (1987)
(citing SEATTLE, WASH., SEATTLE MUN. CODE § 22.210.020 (1985)). In 1980, the City enacted a
Housing Preservation Ordinance that imposed a fee on low-income housing owners when they
converted residential property to a nonresidential use, but the ordinance was invalidated as an
impermissible tax in superior court in 1983. San Telmo Assocs., 108 Wash. 2d at 21–22, 735 P.2d at
673.
46. Id. at 22, 753 P.2d at 673–74 (1987) (citing SEATTLE, WASH., SEATTLE MUN. CODE
§ 22.210.050 (1985)).
47. 108 Wash. 2d at 24, 735 P.2d at 675.
48. 113 Wash. 2d at 409, 780 P.2d at 842.
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forth in Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County49 to determine if the
HPO was an impermissible tax on development, or merely a permissible
development regulation.50 According to the Hillis test, “[if] the primary
purpose [of an ordinance] is to accomplish desired public benefits which
cost money,” it is a tax.51 On the other hand, “if the primary purpose of
legislation is regulation rather than raising revenue,” then it is a
regulation.52 After applying the Hillis test, the San Telmo court held that
Seattle’s HPO required developers to make a large expenditure for the
public good, and therefore imposed an unauthorized tax, ruling that “the
municipal body cannot shift the social costs of development onto a
developer under the guise of a regulation.”53 According to the court,
“[s]uch cost shifting is a tax, and absent specific legislative
pronouncement, the tax is impermissible and invalid.”54
After the San Telmo ruling, the City of Seattle continued to enforce
the tenant relocation provisions of HPO.55 The development company
R/L Associates challenged the provisions, and on appeal the Washington
State Supreme Court concluded that mandatory tenant assistance for
displacement imposed an indirect charge on demolition and changes to
land use.56 According to the court, such charges easily qualified as a
“tax, fee, or charge . . . on the construction or reconstruction of
residential buildings,” which RCW 82.02.020 specifically forbids.57 The
R/L Associates court relied on the plain language of the statute and
overruled San Telmo, declaring that the Hillis tax/regulation distinction
was unnecessary because a payment for development rights is prohibited
unless explicitly excepted by RCW 82.02.020.58
49. 97 Wash. 2d 804, 650 P.2d 193 (1982).
50. San Telmo Assocs., 108 Wash. 2d at 24, 735 P.2d at 674–75.
51. Hillis Homes, 97 Wash. 2d at 809, 650 P.2d at 195 (quoting Haugen v. Gleason, 359 P.2d
108, 111 (Or. 1961)).
52. Id. (quoting Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, 87 Wash. 2d 457, 461, 553 P.2d 1316, 1319
(1976)). The Hillis court invalidated Snohomish County’s attempt to levy a $250 per lot park fee as
a condition for approving new plats because the fee’s purpose was simply to raise revenue, not to
regulate residential developments. Id. at 810, 650 P.2d at 195–96.
53. San Telmo Assocs., 108 Wash. 2d at 24, 735 P.2d at 675.
54. Id.
55. R/L Assocs., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 113 Wash. 2d 402, 405, 780 P.2d 838, 840 (1989).
56. Id. at 407, 780 P.2d at 841.
57. Id. at 406, 780 P.2d at 841 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.020 (1982)).
58. Id. at 409, 180 P.2d at 842. When the City argued that such a literal application would lead to
invalidation of “all otherwise valid police power regulations . . . which incidentally impose an
economic burden,” the court emphasized that the statute clearly outlined the scope of valid
regulations, which include land dedications, easements, costs associated with the permitting process,
charges for water, sewer, gas, and drainage system charges, and other payments to mitigate direct
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Washington Courts Subsequently Emphasized the Need for Strict
Compliance with the Tax Preemption Statute’s Terms

Washington courts have applied the R/L Associates ruling to require
strict and literal compliance with RCW 82.02.020. In Isla Verde
International Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas,59 the Washington State
Supreme Court struck down an open-space requirement that the City of
Camas had imposed on developers as a condition of subdivision
approval.60 The ordinance required every proposed subdivision to set
aside thirty percent of its area as open space in order to maintain an
“open space network” that protected wildlife habitat and preserved
wooded land.61 The court declared the open-space condition an indirect
“tax, fee, or charge,” on new development and invalidated it under RCW
82.02.020.62 In doing so, the court stated that a violation under the
statute need not be an explicit fee or tax, but may also be an indirect “in
kind” tax.63 The court pointed to R/L Associates when announcing that
RCW 82.02.020 must be interpreted according to “its plain terms” and
that the statute prohibits all charges, regardless of whether they are
regulatory fees, regulatory charges, or explicit taxes.64 The court
required “strict compliance” with the statute and emphasized the need
for any lawful charge to fall within one of the exceptions specified in the
statute.65 In determining whether the ordinance qualified under the
statute’s exception for “land dedications,”66 the court held that the city
failed to show how a thirty percent set-aside was reasonably necessary to
mitigate a direct impact of the proposed subdivision.67
In Citizens’ Alliance for Property Rights v. Sims,68 the Washington

consequences of a proposed development. Id. at 407–08, 180 P.2d at 841 (quoting Brief of
Appellant at 25).
59. 146 Wash. 2d 740, 49 P.3d 867 (2002).
60. Id. at 745, 49 P.3d at 870.
61. Id. at 762, 49 P.3d at 879.
62. Id. at 759, 765, 49 P.3d at 878, 881.
63. Id. at 758, 49 P.3d at 877.
64. Id. at 753 n.8, 49 P.3d at 874 n.8.
65. Id. at 755, 49 P.3d at 875–76.
66. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.020 (2012) (allowing “dedications of land or easements within the
proposed development or plat which the county, city, town, or other municipal corporation can
demonstrate are reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed development or plat to
which the dedication of land or easement is to apply”).
67. Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc., 146 Wash. 2d at 759, 49 P.3d at 878.
68. 145 Wash. App. 649, 187 P.3d 786 (2008), cert. denied, 165 Wash. 2d 1030, 203 P.3d 378
(2009).

14 - Ennis Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

6/11/2013 5:03 PM

600

[Vol. 88:591

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

Court of Appeals applied the Isla Verde analysis and held that a King
County clearing and grading regulation constituted an unlawful tax, fee,
or charge on the development of land.69 The court rejected the County’s
argument that the clearing limitations were immune from an RCW
82.02.020 claim because it furthered mandatory statewide Growth
Management Act (GMA) requirements.70 Following a close reading of
Isla Verde, the court reasoned, “whether or not RCW 82.02.020 applies
is not a question of whether another statute authorized the condition.”71
Instead, the court held that conditions imposed by other statutes must fall
in one of RCW 82.02.020’s exceptions or they might be considered an
impermissible tax, fee, or charge.72 Because the County did not base its
clearing and grading restrictions on a site-specific evaluation of each
affected plot of land, the court concluded that the regulation did not meet
the statute’s exception for a valid development impact mitigation.73
C.

Washington’s Affordable Housing Incentive Programs Act Amends
RCW 82.02.020 to Permit Development Costs Imposed by
“Incentive Zoning Programs”

Since San Telmo and R/L Associates, the Washington State
Legislature has twice amended RCW 82.02.020 so as not to frustrate the
intent of ordinances that protect displaced tenants and achieve lowincome housing development objectives.74 First, in 1990, the legislature
amended RCW 82.02.020 to allow for tenant relocation assistance
ordinances.75 More than a decade later, the legislature amended RCW
82.02.020 to protect programs implemented under AHIPA from a tax
preemption challenge.76 AHIPA provides that a “city or county may
enact or expand such [incentive zoning] programs whether or not the

69. Id. at 664, 187 P.3d at 794.
70. Id. at 663–64, 187 P.3d at 793–94.
71. Id. at 664, 187 P.3d at 794.
72. Id. at 664–65, 187 P.3d at 794.
73. Id. at 665, 187 P.3d at 794.
74. See Act of Apr. 24, 1990, ch. 17, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 1996 (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE § 82.02.020 (2012)); Affordable Housing Incentive Programs Act, ch. 149, 2006 Wash. Sess.
Laws 704 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.540; 82.02.020 (2012)).
75. Act of Apr. 24, 1990, ch. 17, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 1996 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 82.02.020 (2012)) (amending WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.020 to include “Nothing in this section
prohibits counties, cities, or towns from requiring property owners to provide relocation assistance
to tenants under RCW 59.18.440 and 59.18.450”).
76. See Affordable Housing Incentive Programs Act, ch. 149, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 704
(codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.540; 82.02.020 (2012)).
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programs may impose a tax, fee, or charge on the development or
construction of property.”77 It also amends RCW 82.02.020 to include,
“Nothing in this section limits the authority of counties, cities, or towns
to implement programs consistent with RCW 36.70A.540 [AHIPA], nor
to enforce agreements made pursuant to such programs.”78 AHIPA’s
amendment to RCW 82.02.020 creates a new exception that
unequivocally allows local jurisdictions to impose regulations under
AHIPA without risking a tax preemption challenge.79
II.

AHIPA EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZES MANDATORY SETASIDE ORDINANCES AND SHIELDS MANDATORY SETASIDES FROM A CHALLENGE UNDER RCW 82.02.020

As the preceding section demonstrates, RCW 82.02.020 presents
serious obstacles to any development regulation that imposes direct or
indirect costs on development. Like the tenant relocation assistance in
San Telmo, a court is likely to declare a mandatory set-aside program an
indirect charge on the construction or reconstruction of residential
buildings. Furthermore, as Citizens’ Alliance for Property Rights v. Sims
demonstrates, simply furthering the goals of state legislation—the GMA,
or AHIPA, for example—is insufficient to overcome a tax preemption
challenge. Instead, an ordinance or development regulation must comply
with the plain language of RCW 82.02.020 by fitting squarely into an
existing exception. Because AHIPA expressly amended RCW
82.02.020, a program that complies with AHIPA’s terms is not an
unlawful tax or fee. But while it is clear that AHIPA authorizes some
form of inclusionary zoning, some still question whether AHIPA
authorizes mandatory set-asides or limits jurisdictions to voluntary
programs.80 This Comment argues that the plain language of the Act, the
legislative history, and the subsequent rules developed by Commerce all
support a conclusion that AHIPA authorizes mandatory set-aside
programs.

77. Affordable Housing Incentive Programs Act, ch. 149, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 704 (codified
at WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.540(1)(b) (2012)).
78. Affordable Housing Incentive Programs Act, ch. 149, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 707 (codified
at WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.020 (2012)).
79. See id.
80. See, e.g., Jorgenson, Greene & Nelson, supra note 9, at 3–4.
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Under Its Plain Language, RCW 36.70A.540 Authorizes Both
Voluntary Incentive Zoning Programs and Mandatory Set-Aside
Programs

RCW 36.70A.540 (AHIPA) provides that jurisdictions adopting
affordable housing incentive programs “may establish a minimum
amount of affordable housing that must be provided by all residential
developments being built under the revised regulations, consistent with
the requirements of this section.”81 A plain reading of this provision
suggests that a jurisdiction may implement a mandatory set-aside
program so long as it complies with “the other requirements” of the
statute.82 For example, a program still must meet the statute’s definition
of “affordable,” respect payment-in-lieu-of-development provisions,
include fifty-year affordability requirements, and abide by all other
mandates.83 Because AHIPA does not contain any requirements that are
incompatible with a mandatory set-aside program, a local jurisdiction
should be permitted to follow this plain reading and implement a
mandatory set-aside program.
AHIPA also provides, “If a developer chooses not to participate in an
optional affordable housing incentive program adopted and authorized
under this section, a city, county, or town may not condition, deny, or
delay the issuance of a permit or development approval . . . absent
incentive provisions of this program.”84 The word “optional” within
AHIPA would be superfluous if jurisdictions were not also authorized to
implement mandatory programs.85 Read in conjunction with the clause
permitting jurisdictions to establish a minimum amount of affordable
housing that must be provided by all residential developments,86 the
plain language of RCW 36.70A.540 permits jurisdictions to adopt both
mandatory and optional (i.e. voluntary) incentive zoning programs.
Some may argue that the mere presence of “incentive housing
programs” in the title precludes a reading of AHIPA that permits
mandatory set-aside programs. However, mandatory set-aside programs
81. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.540(3)(d) (2012) (emphasis added). The entirety of
§ 36.70A.540 was included within one section of ESHB 2984, so a reference to “this section”
includes all of § 36.70A.540.
82. Id.
83. See supra Part I.C (describing specific provisions of the statute).
84. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.540(1)(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
85. See Ford Motor Co. v. City of Seattle, 160 Wash. 2d 32, 41, 156 P.3d 185, 189 (2007) (citing
State v. Keller, 143 Wash. 2d 267, 277, 19 P.3d 1030, 1036 (2001)) (“Constructions that would
render a portion of a statute ‘meaningless or superfluous’ should be avoided.”).
86. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.540(3)(d) (2012) (emphasis added).
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throughout the country require that cities offer incentives to developers
in order to avoid constitutional takings challenges.87 The emphasis on
incentives in AHIPA does not, alone, mean that programs must be
purely optional. The statute clarifies that programs may be modified to
meet local needs and may include provisions not expressly provided in
RCW 36.70A.540 or 82.02.020.88 A jurisdiction with greater lowincome housing needs, such as the City of Seattle, should be able to
enact a mandatory set-aside program under this statute, if that is what
local needs dictate.89 The mere fact that the statute suggests incentive
zoning options does not preclude cities from requiring residential
developments of a certain size to participate in such a program.
B.

Legislative History and Administrative Guidance Support a
Finding that AHIPA Statute Permits Both Voluntary and
Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning

When AHIPA was debated on the floor of the House of
Representatives, there was testimony specifically on the point that the
bill appeared to allow cities to permit mandatory inclusionary zoning.90
The legislature was alerted to this reading of the statute and did not
make any changes to clarify that affordable housing incentive programs
must be strictly optional. The legislature’s omission of language limiting
the scope of AHIPA, as well as subsequent guidance from the
Washington State Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) providing
for both optional and mandatory programs, strongly suggests that
AHIPA condones mandatory set-aside programs.
In 2010, Commerce amended the Washington Administrative Code
chapter 365-196 to add a new section on affordable housing incentives.91
Under the GMA, Commerce has the authority to interpret and administer
GMA requirements.92 Administrative rules bind the court so long as they

87. See, e.g., IGLESIAS & LENTO, supra note 7, at 101–07 (citing programs in Maryland and
California that impose mandatory set-asides but still provide incentives to participating developers).
88. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.540(2)(f) (2012).
89. See Affordable Housing Incentive Programs Act, ch. 149, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 705
(codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.540) (“While this act establishes minimum standards for
those cities, towns, and counties choosing to implement or expand upon an affordable housing
incentive program, cities, towns, and counties are encouraged to enact programs that address local
circumstances and conditions while simultaneously contributing to the statewide need for additional
low-income housing.”).
90. H. Rep., House Bill Report HB 2984, 59-2984, Reg. Sess., at 4 (2006).
91. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-196-870 (2010).
92. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.030 (2012).
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are within an agency’s delegated authority, are reasonable, and were
adopted using the proper procedure.93 Barring any additional proof that
the agency did not follow proper rule-making procedures, or that its
interpretation of RCW 36.70A.540 is unreasonable, Commerce’s rules
on affordable housing incentive programs are binding on the public and
the courts. Even if a court classified Commerce’s rules on AHIPA as a
mere “interpretative statement,” the agency’s interpretation would be
entitled to some deference.94
In promulgating the AHIPA rules, Commerce primarily restated the
text of the statute and reorganized some provisions.95 The Commerce
regulations explicitly state: “Counties and cities may establish an
incentive program that is either required or optional.”96 The regulations
continue with text from AHIPA concerning optional and mandatory
programs:
(a) Counties and cities may establish an optional incentive
program.97 If a developer chooses not to participate in an
optional incentive program, a county or city may not condition,
deny or delay the issuance of a permit or development approval
that is consistent with zoning and development standards on the
subject property absent the optional incentive provisions of this
program.
(b) Counties and cities may establish an incentive program that
requires a minimum amount of affordable housing that must be
provided by all residential developments built under the revised
regulations. The minimum amount of affordable housing may be
a percentage of the units or floor area in a development or of the

93. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. State, Dep’t of Ecology, 86 Wash. 2d 310, 314–15, 545 P.2d 5, 8–9
(1976). Commerce appeared to follow proper procedure: it published the proposed rules on
incentive programs and provided an opportunity for public comment approximately three months
prior to adopting final rules on November 2, 2010. See 10-17 Wash. Reg. 43 (Aug. 11, 2010)
(codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-196 (2010)); 10-22 Wash. Reg. 103 (Dec. 3, 2010)
(codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 365-190, 365-196 (2010)).
94. See Simpson Inv. Co. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 141 Wash. 2d 139, 161–63, 3 P.3d 741,
752–53 (2000) (deference given to Department of Revenue’s interpretation of Washington tax laws
in an interpretative Tax Bulletin); Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 85 Wash. 2d 441,
448, 536 P.2d 157, 161 (1975) (“[W]hen a statute is ambiguous . . . the construction placed upon a
statute by an administrative agency charged with its administration and enforcement . . . should be
given great weight in determining legislative intent.”).
95. Compare WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-196-870 (2012), with WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.540
(2012).
96. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-196-870(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
97. This line is the only line that is not directly from the statute. Compare WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 365-196-870 (2012), with WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.540 (2012).
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development capacity of the site under the revised regulations.98
The regulations clarify what the plain language of the Statute already
states and support the claim that AHIPA expressly authorizes mandatory
set-aside programs in Washington State. The plain language of AHIPA,
the legislative history of the statute, and administrative guidance from
Commerce all support an interpretation that AHIPA authorizes both
optional and mandatory set-aside programs. Because AHIPA created an
exception to the tax preemption limitations of RCW 82.02.020, a
mandatory set-aside program that complies with AHIPA should not be
vulnerable to a tax preemption challenge.
III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS DECLARED TAKINGS—
NOT SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS—AS THE PROPER
ANALYSIS FOR EVALUATING LAND USE REGULATIONS
In addition to the statutory protections offered by RCW 82.02.020, a
landowner in Washington enjoys constitutional protections from both the
federal and state constitutions. Federal takings law is derived from the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,
which prohibit the government from depriving citizens of private
property for public use without just compensation.99 According to the
recent U.S. Supreme Court case Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., a
plaintiff challenging a government regulation as an uncompensated
taking of private property may allege one of four types of takings.100
First, a physical invasion of property by government constitutes a per se
taking that requires compensation.101 Second, a regulation that denies a
landowner of all economically viable use of the property is also a per se
taking.102 Third, a regulation that is neither a physical invasion nor
deprives a landowner of all economically beneficial use may be analyzed
under the three-prong regulatory takings framework set forth in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.103 And finally, a
98. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-196-870(2)(a)-(b) (2012).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239
(1897).
100. 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005) (holding that a plaintiff may allege a physical invasion, a total
taking, a regulatory taking, or an exaction).
101. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (“[A] permanent
physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that
it may serve.”).
102. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
103. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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development exaction—where a government places a condition on
development before issuing a permit—is analyzed according to the
standards set forth in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and
Dolan v. City of Tigard.104
Parts A through C of this Section summarize the four permissible
takings tests under Lingle and provide illustrative examples of how a
court might apply the federal takings framework to a mandatory setaside ordinance. Part D of this Section explains the Lingle Court’s
elimination of substantive due process from its takings analysis.105 It
further emphasizes that Lingle abandoned substantive due process as an
appropriate framework for evaluating land use regulations, except in
circumstances where a regulation either serves no public purpose
whatsoever or is arbitrary and capricious.106
A.

A Regulation that Results in a Permanent Physical Occupation or
a Deprivation of All Economically Beneficial Use Is a Per Se
Taking

A regulation that meets the per se taking criteria automatically
requires just compensation regardless of its social utility.107 Under
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,108 a per se taking
occurs when a statute or regulation results in a permanent physical
occupation of private land.109 However, not every physical intrusion is a
taking: “The permanence and absolute exclusivity of a physical
occupation distinguish[es] it from temporary limitations on the right to
exclude.”110 Under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,111 a per se
taking also occurs when a regulation deprives an owner of all
economically beneficial use.112 Because the Loretto and Lucas standards
are so high, a federal per se taking in the regulatory context is a rare
104. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005).
105. Id. at 540–45.
106. Id. at 543.
107. Lucas, 505 US at 1015. The Court did leave some room for deprivation of all economically
beneficial use without compensation when the State’s property and nuisance laws require it. Id. at
1029–30.
108. 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding a New York statute a taking because it required owners of
apartment buildings to allow cable companies to place cable facilities in their buildings as part of a
plan to offer citywide cable services).
109. Id. at 426.
110. Id. at 435 n.12.
111. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
112. Id. at 1015.
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occurrence.113
B.

Under the Penn Central Analysis, a Court Will Consider Economic
Impact, Interference with Investment-backed Expectations, and
Character of a Government Action

For a land use regulation that does not rise to a per se violation, a
court must engage in a factual inquiry, guided by the balancing test
prescribed in Penn Central.114 In Penn Central, the Supreme Court
upheld a New York historic preservation law that restricted the
development of office buildings over the Grand Central Terminal.115 The
factors that a court must weigh include (1) the economic impact of the
regulation, (2) the extent to which a regulation interferes with
investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the government
action.116 Under Penn Central, an ordinance that promotes the general
welfare, is not of an overly invasive character,117 and still allows owners
a reasonable rate of return should be safe from a takings challenge.118
This is true even when a regulation burdens some more than others.119
Finally, an ordinance will be further protected from a takings challenge
if it gives developers an opportunity for additional economic gain in

113. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324
(2002) (“Land-use regulations are ubiquitous and most of them impact property values in some
tangential way . . . . Treating them all as per se takings would transform government regulation into
a luxury few governments could afford.”).
114. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005).
115. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
116. Id. at 124.
117. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124) (“In addition, the
‘character of the governmental action’—for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion or
instead merely affects property interests through ‘some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good’—may be relevant in discerning whether a
taking has occurred.”).
118. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136–38.
119. Id. at 133–34:
Legislation designed to promote the general welfare commonly burdens some more than
others. The owners of the brickyard in Hadacheck, of the cedar trees in Miller v. Schoene, and
of the gravel and sand mine in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, were uniquely burdened by the
legislation sustained in those cases. Similarly, zoning laws often affect some property owners
more severely than others but have not been held to be invalid on that account. For example,
the property owner in Euclid who wished to use its property for industrial purposes was
affected far more severely by the ordinance than its neighbors who wished to use their land for
residences.
(citing Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928);
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, N.Y., 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926)).
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exchange for the restrictions placed on the land.120
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently applied the Penn Central
factors when evaluating the constitutionality of “manufactured home
park” (MHP) regulations in Tumwater, Washington.121 The City of
Tumwater enacted two ordinances (“the ordinances”) to preserve
existing manufactured home parks within the city by limiting the uses of
particular properties.122 Three of the six affected property owners filed
an action in federal district court, alleging both a federal and state
takings claim.123 The court began its federal takings analysis by noting
that zoning laws do not constitute a taking unless they go “too far.”124
Because Laurel Park Community, L.L.C. v. City of Tumwater provides
an illustrative outline of how an inclusionary zoning regulation might be
evaluated under a federal takings analysis, an analysis of the court’s
assessment of each Penn Central factor is provided under each factor
below.
1.

Economic Impact

Under the Penn Central analysis, a court must consider the economic
impact of a regulation on the affected landowner.125 However, U.S.
Supreme Court decisions “uniformly reject the proposition that
diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a ‘taking.’”126
To their detriment, the Laurel Park plaintiffs offered minimal evidence
of any economic effect resulting from the ordinances.127 They presented
information suggesting that one MHP may have experienced a loss of
15%, while the remaining MHP owners experienced no diminution in
property value.128 The court emphasized that Supreme Court cases have
rejected takings claims where zoning laws caused property values to

120. Id. at 137–38. The City was helped by a provision of the law that allowed development
rights to transfer to other properties in the area. The transferred development rights helped mitigate
the economic impact of the regulation, as did the fact that appellants may have been able to develop
a less intrusive structure in the space above the terminal. Id. at 136–37.
121. See Laurel Park Cmty., L.L.C. v. City of Tumwater, 698 F.3d 1180, 1188–91 (9th Cir.
2012).
122. Id. at 1186.
123. Id. at 1187–88. The property owners also alleged a substantive due process violation under
the Washington Constitution, id. at 1188, and this claim will be considered in Part V.
124. Id. at 1188 (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).
125. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
126. Laurel Park, 698 F.3d at 1189 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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drop by as much as 75% and 87.5%.129 Consequently, the Laurel Park
court held that the economic impact of the ordinances on plaintiffs’
property did not support a takings claim.130
2.

Distinct Investment-Backed Expectations

After evaluating the economic impact of a regulation, a court will
evaluate the extent to which the regulation disrupted any “distinct
investment-backed expectations.”131 The plaintiffs in Laurel Park argued
that when they purchased the MHPs, they had an expectation that they
would convert the land to more profitable use as allowed by the prior
zoning laws when market conditions approved.132 But Penn Central
provides, “the submission that [the plaintiffs] may establish a ‘taking’
simply by showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit a
property interest that they heretofore had believed was available for
development is quite simply untenable.”133 The Laurel Park court relied
on this principle to emphasize that the owners’ “primary expectation”
was the ability to continue operating their properties as MHPs and not
the opportunity to change the use at some unspecified point in the
future.134 The court also provided the following explanation for
measuring plaintiff’s expectations: “Speculative possibilities of
windfalls do not amount to ‘distinct investment-backed expectations,’
unless they are shown to be probable enough materially to affect the
price.”135 Because the speculative possibility of converting MHPs into
another use had little to no effect on the price of the plaintiffs’ land, the
court determined that the “distinct investment-backed expectations”
factor did not support a takings claim.136
3.

Character of the Government Action

Finally, a court will balance the economic impact of a regulation and
its interference with investment expectations with the “character of the
129. Id. (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (75% diminution);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915) (87.5% diminution)).
130. Id.
131. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
132. Laurel Park, 698 F.3d at 1189.
133. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130.
134. Laurel Park, 698 F.3d at 1189–90.
135. Id. at 1190 (quoting Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1120–21 (9th Cir.
2010)).
136. Id.
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governmental action.”137 To evaluate the character of government action,
a court will consider whether the government action amounts to a
physical invasion or just affects property interests through some public
program that “adjust[s] the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good.”138 Courts differ in their application of this
test,139 but the factors they may consider include whether a regulation
resembles a direct appropriation of property,140 whether a regulation
interferes with legitimate property interests,141 and how severe of a
burden a regulation imposes.142 Some courts may also consider whether
a burden is spread widely across society;143 however, the Penn Central
court emphasized, “legislation designed to promote the general welfare
commonly burdens some more than others.”144 Thus, under Penn
Central, the unavoidable imbalance that results from land use
regulations is not a deciding factor in takings cases.145
When considering the character of the government action, the Laurel
Park court relied almost exclusively on language from Armstrong v.
United States146 stating that the government may not “forc[e] some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.”147 The Laurel Park court then
acknowledged that the MHP ordinances did require a small number of
landowners—six in fact148—to provide a public benefit that could have
been distributed more widely across the community.149 The court
conceded that, while it was a “close call,” the burden-shifting character

137. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
138. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at
124).
139. See 2 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 16.9 (5th ed. 2008).
140. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
141. See, e.g., Lingle, 438 U.S. at 540.
142. Id. at 544.
143. See Laurel Park Cmty., L.L.C. v. City of Tumwater, 698 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 2012).
144. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 133.
145. See id. (“The owners of the brickyard in Hadacheck, of the cedar trees in Miller v. Schoene,
and of the gravel and sand mine in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, were uniquely burdened by the
legislation sustained in those cases.”) (citing Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Miller
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, N.Y., 369 U.S. 590 (1962)).
146. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
147. Laurel Park, 698 F.3d at 1190 (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537
(2005) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960))).
148. Id. at 1187.
149. Id. at 1190.
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of the MHP ordinances slightly favored Plaintiffs’ takings claim.150
However, the court’s concern was mitigated by the fact that the
ordinance did not force the plaintiffs to continue operating their
properties as MHPs.151 Because the first two Penn Central factors
weighed strongly against a takings claim and the third factor weighed
only slightly in favor of a takings claim, the court concluded that the
ordinances did not constitute a facial taking under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.152
In contrast to Laurel Park, the Lingle Court rejected the plaintiff’s
broad appeal to invalidate a statute based on the Armstrong burdenshifting language.153 The Lingle court pointed out that, “[a] test that tells
us nothing about the actual burden imposed on property rights, or how
that burden is allocated, cannot tell us when justice might require that
the burden be spread among taxpayers through the payment of
compensation.”154 Instead, the Lingle Court emphasized that the takings
tests aim to identify regulatory actions that function like a “classic
taking,” where the government directly appropriates private property or
removes an owner from his or her land.155 Under Lingle, a court should
look to the severity of the burden imposed on property rights and the
extent to which the regulation interferes with legitimate property
interests.156
C.

Development Conditions Must Meet the Nexus and Proportionality
Requirements of Nollan and Dolan

Nollan and Dolan provide a final layer of constitutional protection for
landowners when a government entity imposes conditions on land
development.157 In Nollan, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a condition
on property development is a taking if the condition does not further the
government’s legitimate justification for regulating.158 The Court struck
down a regulation that required owners of beachfront property to grant a
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1190–91. Plaintiffs still had the freedom to sell the properties or convert them to
another permitted MHP district use. Id.
152. Id. at 1191.
153. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542–43 (2005) (quoting Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
154. Id. at 543.
155. Id. at 539.
156. Id. at 539–40.
157. See id. at 548.
158. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1987).
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public easement across the beach portion of their property in exchange
for building permits.159 A regulation that protected the beach from
burdens created by the new building would have been permissible, but
the Commission’s plan lacked any “nexus” between the condition and
the purpose, and thus amounted to an “out-and-out plan of extortion”
rather than a valid regulation of land.160
Dolan v. City of Tigard further clarified the requirements of Nollan by
explaining the required degree of connection between an exaction and
the impact of a proposed development.161 After finding a “nexus”
between a legitimate state interest and a permit condition, a court must
evaluate whether the exactions on development were “rough[ly]
proportional[]” to the government’s justification for regulating.162 To
prove proportionality, a city must make an “individualized
determination” that the required dedication is related to the impact of the
proposed development both in nature and extent.163 Finally, Dolan
clarified that the burden of proof lies with the party challenging a
generally applicable zoning regulation, but with the city when the city
imposes a condition on an individual party.164
Because mandatory set-aside ordinances condition development on
developers renting units at below market rate or paying into a housing
fund, they may need to be evaluated under the exactions framework.165
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has already applied Nollan to an
inclusionary zoning ordinance that required commercial developers to
pay a Housing Trust Fund fee prior to receiving a building permit.166 In
Commercial Builders of Northern California v. City of Sacramento,167
the court held that the law met the Nollan standard for development
conditions because the City demonstrated a sufficient nexus between

159. Id. at 841–42.
160. Id. at 837 (quoting J. E. D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H.
1981)). To satisfy the “nexus” requirement, there must be some link between the asserted legitimate
state interest and the permit condition imposed by the government. Id.
161. Id. at 391.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 391, 393.
164. Id. at 391 n.8.
165. See, e.g., James S. Burling & Graham Owen, The Implications of Lingle on Inclusionary
Zoning and Other Legislative and Monetary Exactions, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 423 (2009) (“For
the most part, the courts have not yet properly applied the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to
inclusionary zoning.”); David L. Callies, Mandatory Set-Asides as Land Development Conditions,
URB. LAW., Fall 2010/Winter 2011, at 307, 322–23.
166. Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 876 (9th. Cir. 1991).
167. 941 F.2d 872.
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new commercial developments and the shortage of affordable housing in
the city.168 The court clarified that Nollan does not require a showing
that the development directly caused the “social ill in question.”169
Rather, it was sufficient for the City to rely on a detailed study revealing
a substantial connection between commercial development and a lack of
affordable housing in the community.170
California state courts have also applied Nollan and Dolan to
inclusionary zoning ordinances and upheld the ordinances so long as
they provide an opportunity for relief to property owners who can
demonstrate the absence of any reasonable relationship or nexus
between the impact of the development and the inclusionary
requirement.171 The California courts have also adopted a deferential
standard of review for generally applicable inclusionary zoning
legislation, holding that the heightened standard of Nollan and Dolan
only applies to individualized development fees.172 In sum, courts that
have applied the development conditions framework to inclusionary
zoning have upheld mandatory set-aside ordinances so long as they are
supported by a “nexus study” and provide some administrative relief to
individual property owners who can demonstrate that the ordinance
lacks a nexus or reasonable relationship as applied to their property.
D.

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. Removed the Last Remnants of
Federal Substantive Due Process from Land Use Takings Claims

Government entities may act under their police power to regulate
activities for the protection of health, safety, morals, and general
welfare.173 But when the government exceeds the limits of its authority,

168. Id. at 875. The City produced studies that showed the link between new commercial
developments and a need for additional affordable housing. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 2002) (holding
that Dolan only applies to individualized development fees and not generally applicable ones);
Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 954 (2002) (holding that for generally applicable legislation, “the heightened
standard of review described in Nollan and Dolan is inapplicable . . . .”). But see Bldg. Indus. Ass’n
of San Diego Cnty., Inc. v. City of San Diego, No. GIC817064, 2006 WL 1666822 (Cal. Super. Ct.
May 24, 2006) (holding San Diego’s mandatory set-aside ordinance an unconstitutional exaction
because it did not provide for waivers when a developer could demonstrate an absence of “nexus”
or “reasonable relationship”).
172. See San Remo Hotel L.P., 41 P.3d at 103, 105; Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal., 108 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 66.
173. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928).
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a citizen may bring a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment.174 With the end of the Lochner era in the late 1930s, the
Supreme Court largely abandoned its reliance on substantive due process
to strike down social and economic legislation.175 However, some
remnants of the substantive due process analysis remained in the Court’s
takings analysis.176 The intertwining of due process and takings law
culminated in the U.S. Supreme Court case Agins v. City of
Tiburon177.178 In Agins, the Court declared that the “application of a
general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance
does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.”179 This
“substantially advances” formula was subsequently cited as a standalone regulatory takings test independent from Penn Central and the per
se takings tests.180
In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court explained
the importance of keeping takings and substantive due process analyses
distinct and eliminated the vestiges of due process analysis from its
preferred takings framework.181 After reviewing the history of the
“substantially advances” language, the Lingle court concluded that the
formula was derived from due process and not takings precedent and
concluded that the test was not a valid takings inquiry.182 In overruling
Agins, the Court declared the “substantially advances” formula a
“means-end” review that required courts to determine if a regulation of
private property is effective in achieving some legitimate public
purpose.183 The Court then highlighted the practical challenges of such a
test and suggested the test would require judges to substitute their own

174. Id. at 188–89. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
175. 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.4(b) (5th ed. 2012). In the late 1800s and in the first third of the
1900s, the U.S. Supreme Court fully embraced the substantive due process doctrine and Justices
routinely invalidated social and economic legislation that they—at their discretion—determined was
not “reasonably related” to legitimate ends. See id. § 15.3(a).
176. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (examining whether
prohibition of excavation below the water table exceeds town’s police power and is thus a taking).
177. 477 U.S. 255 (1980), overruled by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
178. See Lingle, 544 US at 531–32.
179. Agins, 477 U.S. at 260.
180. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540.
181. See id. at 540–46.
182. See id. at 540–45.
183. Id. at 542.
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judgments for those of the policy-making branches of government.184
The unanimous Lingle court did acknowledge a limited, ongoing role
for substantive due process considerations, explaining, “[t]he Takings
Clause presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid
public purpose.”185 A regulation may be impermissible “because it fails
to meet the ‘public use’ requirement or is so arbitrary as to violate due
process,” and in either of those instances, “no amount of compensation
can authorize such action.”186 Justice Kennedy also wrote separately to
emphasize that the Court’s decision did not preclude substantive due
process challenges for arbitrary or irrational regulations.187 However, the
Court has only rarely invalidated a regulation on substantive due process
grounds and has stated a strong preference for deferring to legislative
determinations regarding the need for and likely effectiveness of
regulatory actions.188 At the very least, the Court made it clear that
courts should no longer inquire into whether a government action
effectively promotes a legitimate interest when deciding whether an
action constitutes a taking.189
IV. WASHINGTON’S TAKINGS ANALYSIS DIFFERS
CONSIDERABLY FROM THE FEDERAL TAKINGS
ANALYSIS
Although the Washington takings analysis is based on federal takings
law, it introduces novel elements and unique interpretations of federal
law.190 Most notably, the Washington approach includes a “threshold
test” that funnels disputed land use regulations into either a substantive
due process analysis or a takings analysis.191 Because the standard
remedy for a due process violation is invalidation of the offensive
184. Id. at 544 (“[Such a test] would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast array of
state and federal regulations . . . . Moreover, it would empower—and might often require—courts to
substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected legislatures and expert agencies.”).
185. Id. at 543.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 545. Even prior to Lingle, some federal circuit courts have discouraged using
substantive due process when a takings analysis is more appropriate. See, e.g., Coniston Corp. v.
Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 465–66 (7th Cir. 1988) (arguing that an overreliance on the
due process analysis gives judges too much discretion and invites courts to sit in judgment of all
state action).
189. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548.
190. See Wynne, supra note 28, at 170–77.
191. Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 594, 854 P.2d 1, 6 (1993); Presbytery of Seattle v.
King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 329, 787 P.2d 907, 912 (1990).
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regulation, the Washington method has been criticized for shielding
local governments from paying compensation, as required under a
takings claim.192 It has also been criticized as being “needlessly
confusing”193 and for claiming to adopt a federal analysis when in fact
Washington’s method is unique.194 This section reviews Washington’s
takings analysis while the next section discusses Washington’s due
process analysis.
A.

Washington Courts Apply a Takings Test that Combines Elements
of Federal Law with Elements of Washington State Law

In Orion Corp. v. State,195 the Washington State Supreme Court
attempted to harmonize inconsistencies between state and federal takings
law by simply applying the federal takings analysis to resolve a takings
claim based on both the U.S. and Washington Constitutions.196 Three
years later, the Washington State Supreme Court abandoned the pure
federal analysis and restated Washington takings law as a coordinated
approach meant to combine both Washington and federal takings law in
a “comprehensive formula.”197 Over the next several years the court
applied the Washington formula even to claims that raised only a federal
takings challenge.198
Until the Washington State Supreme Court decided Manufactured
Housing Communities of Washington v. State,199 the court had never
engaged in a conscious analysis of whether the Washington Constitution
provided additional protection to Washington citizens in the context of a
takings claim.200 Although article I, section 16 of the Washington

192. See Wynne, supra note 28, at 160–63.
193. Id. at 176.
194. Id. at 155.
195. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987).
196. Id. at 657–58, 747 P.2d at 1082 (“The breadth of constitutional protection under the state
and federal just compensation clauses remains virtually identical.”).
197. Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 328, 787 P.2d 907, 912 (1990).
198. Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 604–08, 854 P.2d 1, 11–14 (1993); Sintra, Inc. v.
City of Seattle (Sintra I), 119 Wash. 2d 1, 13–18, 829 P.2d 765, 771–75 (1992); Robinson v. City of
Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 49–54, 830 P.2d 318, 327–31 (1992).
199. 142 Wash. 2d 347, 13 P.3d 183 (2000). See infra Part IV.B.i for a discussion of the case and
its holdings.
200. Manufactured Hous, 142 Wash. 2d at 356 n.7, 13 P.3d at 187–88 n.7 (“[I]n this case, we
answer the call to conduct a Gunwall analysis for the first time and should not be limited to prior
pronouncements of parallelism between our state and federal takings’ clauses.”) (emphasis in
original). In Washington, before applying a unique interpretation of a federal constitutional
provision or relying on an independent provision of the state constitution, a court must undergo a
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Constitution is not identical to the federal takings clause,201 the
Washington State Supreme Court often treated them as if they provided
the same protections.202 The Manufactured Housing court determined
that the Washington State Constitution provided broader protections to
property owners than did the federal Constitution.203 This contrasted
sharply with the court’s previous commitment in Orion to follow a
federal approach.204 Since the Manufactured Housing decision, at least
one federal court in Washington has continued to rely on Orion’s
pronouncement that the federal and state takings clauses are coextensive
and applied a federal analysis even for state takings claims.205
The U.S. Supreme Court made a significant course change with its
decision in Lingle, and the Washington State Supreme Court has not yet
explained how that decision might impact the Washington takings
analysis.206 Both Division I and Division II of the Washington State
Court of Appeals have acknowledged that Lingle may obviate certain
elements of the Washington analysis, but declared that the effect of

“Gunwall analysis,” which includes six nonexclusive criteria for determining whether the
Washington Constitution extends broader rights than the U.S. Constitution. See Hugh D. Spitzer,
Which Constitution? Eleven Years of Gunwall in Washington State, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1187,
1193–94 (1998).
201. The Fifth Amendment states: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. In contrast, Article I, Section 16 of the Washington State
Constitution provides:
Private property shall not be taken for private use, except for private ways of necessity, and for
drains, flumes, or ditches on or across the lands of others for agricultural, domestic, or sanitary
purposes. No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just
compensation having been first made . . . .
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16.
202. See Manufactured Hous., 142 Wash. 2d at 405–06, 13 P.3d at 212–13 (Talmadge, J.
dissenting) (“Until today, we have interpreted art. I, § 16 and the Fifth Amendment as essentially
coextensive.”).
203. Id. at 361, 13 P.3d 1 at 190.
204. See Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 657–58, 747 P.2d 1062, 1082 (1987) (“[I]n
order to avoid exacerbating the confusion surrounding the regulatory takings doctrine, and because
the federal approach may in some instance provide broader protection, we will apply the federal
analysis to review all regulatory takings claims.”). The Manufactured Housing court pointed out
that because Orion failed to consider Gunwall in its analysis, the Orion court’s assertion that the
state and federal takings analyses are “coextensive” was not binding. Manufactured Hous., 142
Wash. 2d at 356 n.7, 13 P.3d at 187–88 n.7.
205. See Heitman v. City of Spokane Valley, No. CV–09–0070–FVS, 2010 WL 816727, at *2
(E.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 2010) (holding that Washington state courts expressed an intent for regulatory
takings to be consistent with the federal constitution and declining to decide the case on independent
state grounds because the plaintiff failed to brief the requisite Gunwall factors).
206. This question is especially relevant for substantive due process inquiries that were adopted
directly from federal takings law.
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Lingle on Washington takings claims was not yet decided.207 Perhaps the
question will be answered soon in Lemire v. Pollution Control Hearings
Board,208 a land use case recently argued by the Washington State
Supreme Court.209 The remainder of this section will discuss
Washington’s takings analysis as it currently stands, which consists of
two threshold questions followed by a full takings analysis.
B.

A Court Begins the Washington Takings Analysis By Applying Two
Threshold Tests

A Washington court begins its analysis of a land use regulation claim
with two threshold questions. First, the court will assess whether the
regulation constitutes a per se taking or destroys one or more of the
fundamental attributes of property ownership. Second, the court will ask
whether the regulation protects the public interest in health, safety, the
environment, or fiscal integrity (general welfare), that is, whether the
regulation is a proper exercise of police power.210 By asking these
questions at the outset, the court may determine whether a government
action is a per se taking requiring just compensation, or whether the
claim should be funneled into a due process analysis or a takings
analysis.211

207. See Thun v. City of Bonney Lake, 164 Wash. App. 755, 761 n.4, 265 P.3d 207, 212 n.4
(2011); City of Des Moines v. Gray Bus., LLC, 130 Wash. App. 600, 612 n.33, 124 P.3d 324, 330
n.33 (2005) (noting that Lingle removes the “substantially advances” inquiry and hypothesizing that
the Guimont test will be replaced by the federal tests described in Lingle).
208. No. 87703-3 (Wash. argued Nov. 13, 2012).
209. Id. The Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys submitted an amicus brief
urging the court to abandon the state takings analysis in favor of the federal analysis. The brief
relied largely on the arguments in Roger Wynne’s article, see generally Wynne, supra note 28, and
cited to the article extensively. Brief for Washington State Ass’n of Municipal Attorneys et al. as
Amici Curiae, Lemire v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., No. 87703-3 (Wash. Sept. 28, 2011).
210. Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 594, 854 P.2d 1, 6 (1993).
211. Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra I), 119 Wash. 2d 1, 15, 829 P.2d 765, 772 (1992) (“The
threshold test is designed to prevent undue chilling on legislative bodies’ attempts to properly and
carefully structure land use regulations which prevent public harms.”). The Washington State
Supreme Court has stated the distinction between eminent domain power and the police power as
follows: “Eminent domain takes private property for a public use, while the police power regulates
its use and enjoyment, or if it takes or damages it, it is not a taking or damaging for the public use,
but to conserve the safety, morals, health and general welfare of the public.” Eggleston v. Pierce
Cnty., 148 Wash. 2d 760, 768, 64 P.3d 618, 623 (2003) (quoting Conger v. Pierce Cnty., 116 Wash.
27, 36, 198 P. 377, 380 (1921)).
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A Washington Court Will Inquire into Whether a Government
Action Is a Per Se Taking under Loretto, Lucas or under
Washington’s “Fundamental Attribute” Test

Under the first prong of the threshold test, a court must determine if
the government has engaged in a “per se” taking.212 A “per se” or
“categorical” taking occurs when the regulation constitutes either a
“physical invasion” or “total taking” under the Loretto and Lucas tests,
or destroys a fundamental attribute of ownership.213 While the physical
invasion and total takings elements are adopted directly from federal
takings law, the “fundamental attribute” element is unique to
Washington.214 Under the Washington test, a fundamental attribute of
ownership includes the right to possess, to exclude others, or dispose of
property.215 When the government engages in any of the three
categorical takings, just compensation is required and no further analysis
is necessary.216 If a landowner alleges an intrusion that is less severe
than a physical invasion, a total taking, or a derogation of a fundamental
attribute of ownership, the court then moves to the second threshold
question.217
In Manufactured Housing, a plurality of the Washington State
Supreme Court held that a statute giving qualified tenant organizations
the right of first refusal during the sale of a mobile home park destroyed
a fundamental attribute of ownership.218 In a splintered opinion,219 a
plurality determined that a tenant’s right of first refusal disrupted the
park owner’s right to freely dispose of his or her property.220 The
212. Guimont v. City of Seattle (Guimont II), 77 Wash. App. 74, 80, 896 P.2d 70, 76 (1995); see
also Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 598–604, 854 P.2d at 8–11.
213. Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 600, 854 P.2d at 9.
214. Wynne, supra note 28, at 164–66. According to Wynne, this third prong has created some
confusion in the takings analysis. Id. at 143–44. The Guimont II court was unsure how to treat a
regulation that did not constitute a “physical invasion” or “total taking” but that implicated a
fundamental attribute of property ownership. Id. at 143. The Manufactured Housing court
subsequently treated the “fundamental attribute” violation as a “categorical” taking—in the same
category as a per se taking. Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 355,
13 P.3d 183, 187 (2000).
215. Manufactured Hous., 142 Wash. 2d at 355, 13 P.3d at 187.
216. Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 600, 854 P.2d at 9–10.
217. Id. at 603, 854 P.2d at 10.
218. Manufactured Hous., 142 Wash. 2d at 374, 13 P.3d at 191–94.
219. Three justices signed Justice Ireland’s majority opinion, and Justice Madsen concurred in the
result only. Justice Sanders wrote a separate concurrence and Justice Johnson wrote a dissent, which
Justice Smith also signed. Finally, Justice Talmadge wrote his own dissent.
220. Manufactured Hous., 142 Wash. 2d at 364–68, 13 P.3d at 196–97.
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plurality also classified the right of first refusal as an important property
right and held that a statutory transfer of a property right from one
private individual to another constitutes a taking.221 The lead opinion
then held that the disruption of the right to freely dispose of property and
the forced transfer of a property right interfered with fundamental
attributes of ownership and declared the statute a per se taking.222
Finally, the lead opinion distinguished the protections of the Washington
State Constitution from the U.S. Constitution and declared that the
state’s constitution contained “an absolute prohibition against taking
private property for private use.”223 It held that the Washington
Constitution’s absolute prohibition against taking private property for
private purposes cut off further inquiries into appropriate
compensation.224 As a remedy, the plurality simply invalidated the law
that restricted the right of a mobile home park owner to freely dispose of
his or her property and sell to any chosen buyer.225
In his dissent, Justice Charles Johnson disagreed with the plurality
view that the right of first refusal was a property right.226 He asserted
that even if the statute implicated a fundamental attribute of ownership,
not every infringement on that attribute necessarily constitutes a
taking.227 Justice Phil Talmadge supported Johnson’s opinion, but wrote
separately to express his concern about the effect of the majority’s
disposition on the police power in Washington.228 Talmadge emphasized
the statute’s unanimous passage by the state legislature and warned of
the dangers of allowing such an imprecise takings analysis to intrude on
the police power in ways that could affect “everything from social
welfare law to public health rules to environmental and land use
regulation.”229 He also wrote, “The majority departs from the traditional
221. Id. at 369–70, 13 P.3d at 194–95.
222. Id. at 366, 13 P.3d at 192.
223. Id. at 357–59, 13 P.3d at 188–89 (the court characterized the federal constitution as only
prohibiting the taking of private property without a justifying public purpose).
224. Id. at 361–62, 13 P.3d at 190.
225. Id. (“[Article 1, section 16 of the Washington State Constitution’s] absolute prohibition
against taking private property for private use bars any additional inquiry about compensation and
requires invalidation of chapter 59.23 RCW.”). It is interesting to note that invalidating the statute is
at odds with the prescribed remedy for a taking, which is just compensation. See Sintra, Inc. v. City
of Seattle (Sintra II), 131 Wash. 2d 640, 689–90, 935 P.2d 555, 580 (1997).
226. Id. at 385–87, 13 P.3d at 202–04 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (citing numerous cases to that end
and writing that no interest in land is created by a right of first refusal, and therefore only personal
rights are affected).
227. Id. at 387, 13 P.3d at 203.
228. Id. at 392, 13 P.3d 206 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 426–27, 13 P.3d at 223–24.
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elements of takings law we articulated in [Guimont], in favor of a novel
interpretation of art. I, § 16 of our Constitution by suggesting even a
minor regulation of property may be a taking.”230 Instead, he advocated
following the well-established Penn Central regulatory takings
analysis,231 and found it instructive to consider the outcome under
Washington’s substantive due process test.232
2.

If a Regulation Is Not a Per Se Taking, a Washington Court Will
Ask if the Regulation “Seeks Less to Prevent a Harm” than to
Require Others to “Provide an Affirmative Public Benefit”

The second part of the threshold test asks if the regulation protects the
public interest in health, safety, the environment, or fiscal integrity.233
According to Washington courts, it is important to distinguish between
due process and takings claims because “the police power and the power
of eminent domain are essential and distinct powers of government.”234
In Washington, local governments enjoy broad police power,235 and
local jurisdictions may put forth any regulation that complies with state
law, aims to achieve a legitimate government interest,236 and is
reasonably calculated to achieve that purpose.237 Courts must look
beyond “labels” to determine whether a government action is properly
characterized as police power or eminent domain power.238 Not every
government action that takes, damages, or destroys property is a taking:
“[e]minent domain takes private property for a public use, while the
police power regulates its use and enjoyment, or if it takes or damages it,
it is not a taking or damaging for the public use, but to conserve the
230. Id. at 405, 13 P.3d at 212 (citations omitted) (“Until today, we have interpreted art. I, § 16
and the Fifth Amendment as essentially coextensive.”).
231. Id. at 406, 13 P.3d at 213.
232. Id. at 411–12, 13 P.3d at 215–16 (the plaintiff did not raise a substantive due process
violation, but Justice Talmadge engaged in the analysis to demonstrate how the statute would fare).
233. Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 49–50, 830 P.2d 318, 328 (1992); Presbytery
of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 329–30, 787 P.2d 907, 912 (1990).
234. Eggleston v. Pierce Cnty., 148 Wash. 2d 760, 767, 64 P.3d 618, 623 (2003).
235. See Hugh D. Spitzer, Municipal Police Power in Washington State, 75 WASH. L. REV. 495,
497–506 (2000).
236. This interest is “wide and comprehensive” and includes promoting “the public peace, health,
safety, morals, education, good order and welfare.” Spokane Cnty. v. Valu-Mart, Inc., 69 Wash. 2d
712, 719, 419 P.2d 993, 998 (1966) (citing Shea v. Olsen, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936)).
237. See Donya Williamson, Note, Urbanites Versus Rural Rights: Contest of Local Government
Land-Use Regulations Under Washington Preemption Statute 82.02.020, 84 WASH. L. REV. 491
(2009) (citing Spitzer, supra note 235, at 507–509).
238. Eggleston, 148 Wash. 2d at 767, 64 P.3d at 623.
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safety, morals, health and general welfare of the public.”239
In Presbytery of Seattle v. King County,240 the court contrasted
permissible regulations of the public interest with impermissible
regulations “that go[] beyond preventing a public harm and actually
enhance[] a publicly owned right in property.”241 In subsequent cases,
the court equated a valid regulation with the standard police power
definition (health, safety, general welfare),242 and restated an
impermissible regulation as one that “seeks less to prevent a harm than
to impose on those regulated the requirement of providing an affirmative
public benefit.”243 The court has acknowledged the tension present in the
test: “[b]oth the conferral of benefit and the prevention of a real harm are
often present in varying degrees.”244
In Sintra Inc. v. City of Seattle,245 the Washington State Supreme
Court considered yet another challenge to the City of Seattle HPO,246
this time considering the constitutionality of the ordinance.247 The
landowner in Sintra brought a takings action under both the state and
federal constitutions and a due process claim to recover damages he
incurred while subject to the HPO.248 The court addressed the threshold
question of whether the HPO was merely a permissible police power to
safeguard the public interest.249 The City argued that the ordinance was
“enacted to prevent a public harm—displacement and homelessness of
low-income tenants” and that it did not “enhance any publicly-owned
interest in property.”250 The court rejected the argument and held that the
regulatory scheme went beyond preventing harm because it required

239. Id. at 767–68, 64 P.3d at 623 (quoting Conger v. Pierce Cnty., 116 Wash. 27, 36, 198 P. 377,
380 (1921)) (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
240. 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907 (1990).
241. Id. at 329, 787 P.2d at 912.
242. Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 595, 854 P.2d 1, 6 (1993) (“If the regulation merely
protects the public health, safety, and welfare (question 1) . . . .”).
243. Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 49, 830 P.2d 318, 328 (1992); see also
Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 603, 854 P.2d at 10.
244. Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 329 n.13, 787 P.2d 907, 912 n.13
(1990).
245. Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra I), 119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765 (1992).
246. See supra Part I for a discussion of the HPO.
247. Sintra I, 119 Wash. 2d at 10, 829 P.2d at 770.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 13, 829 P.2d at 771. Prior to Guimont, this threshold question was asked prior to the
“fundamental attributes of property ownership” threshold question. See Guimont v. Clarke, 121
Wash. 2d 586, 600, 845 P.2d 1, 9 (1993).
250. Sintra I, 119 Wash. 2d at 14, 829 P.2d at 772 (quoting Brief of Respondent at 37).
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landowners to make additional steps of providing new housing.251
According to the court, the allocation of burden to individual property
owners, rather than citizens at large, exceeded the City’s police power
and met the requirements of the takings threshold test.252
In sum, a regulation that does not destroy a fundamental attribute of
property ownership and seeks only to protect the public health, safety,
and general welfare, is not subject to a takings challenge; instead, the
governmental action must be evaluated simply for its validity under due
process law.253 On the other hand, a regulation that “goes beyond mere
harm prevention to require a property owner to provide a public benefit,”
must be evaluated under the takings framework.254
C.

Under the Washington Takings Framework, a Court Asks if A
Regulation “Substantially Advances a Legitimate State Interest”
Before Applying the Penn Central Analysis

Once a claim makes its way through a threshold analysis and into the
takings branch, a Washington court will ask if a regulation “substantially
advances a legitimate state interest.”255 If the regulation does not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest, it is treated as a
taking.256 If it does advance a legitimate interest, the court will then
apply the federal Penn Central tests.257 Washington’s Penn Central test
does not differ from the federal analysis described in Part III.A.2 above.
What remains unique is the “substantially advances a legitimate state
interest” test, which was abandoned by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Lingle.258 In City of Des Moines v. Gray Business, LLC,259 a Washington
State appellate court raised the point that Lingle abolished this portion of
the federal takings test and suggested that Washington should probably

251. Id. at 15, 829 P.2d at 773.
252. Id. at 15–16, 829 P.2d at 773. Ironically, the result of exceeding the police power is to
continue with a takings analysis. If the court determined that the regulation did not “seek less to
prevent a harm than to impose an affirmative benefit,” the analysis would move to the substantive
due process analysis and essentially ask if the City exceeded its police power.
253. Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 50, 830 P.2d 318, 328 (1992).
254. Id. at 50, 830 P.2d at 328; see also Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 595, 845 P.2d 1, 6
(1993).
255. Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 333, 787 P.2d 907, 914 (1990).
256. Margola Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 121 Wash. 2d 625, 645, 854 P.2d 23, 35 (1993);
Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 333, 787 P.2d at 914.
257. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 335–36, 787 P.2d at 915.
258. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2004). See also supra Part III.B.
259. 130 Wash. App. 600, 124 P.3d 324 (2005).
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eliminate its “substantially advances” inquiry as well.260 However, the
Washington State Supreme Court has given only a cursory analysis of
this test when considering past housing ordinances; and, in each instance
the court concluded the ordinance substantially advanced a legitimate
interest.261
V.

WASHINGTON HAS RETAINED A SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS ANALYSIS FOR DETERMINING THE VALIDITY
OF LAND USE REGULATIONS

Washington’s reliance on substantive due process in land use cases
differs fundamentally from the U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of
substantive due process and takings law.262 The Washington State
Supreme Court has explained that a regulation that is a valid use of the
police power is not a taking.263 The U.S. Supreme Court, by contrast,
presumes a regulation’s validity under the police power before even
engaging in a takings analysis.264 After Lingle, the U.S. Supreme Court
will only engage in a substantive due process analysis in the most
egregious circumstances—for example, where a regulation is arbitrary or
capricious.265 The Washington State Supreme Court has not commented
on the continued value of its unique substantive due process test after
Lingle.266 As things currently stand, Washington courts employ a threepart substantive due process test and ask: (1) whether the regulation is
aimed at achieving a legitimate public purpose; (2) whether it uses
means that are reasonably necessary for achieving that purpose; and (3)
whether it is unduly oppressive to the land owner.267 The third prong is
often the most difficult and determinative one.268
260. Id. at 612 n.33, 124 P.3d at 330 n.33.
261. See Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 609–10, 854 P.2d 1, 14–15 (1993) (mobile home
relocation assistance advances a legitimate interest in assisting victims of mobile home park
closings); Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra I), 119 Wash. 2d 1, 17, 829 P.2d 765, 774 (1992)
(HPO advances legitimate interest of protecting City’s low income housing supply); Robinson v.
City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 53, 830 P.2d 318, 330 (1992) (HPO “advance[s] legitimate state
interests in the general welfare of the citizens of Seattle in attempting to preserve rental housing
stock and assist low income tenants.”).
262. See supra Part IV.
263. Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra II), 131 Wash. 2d 640, 690, 935 P.2d 555, 581 (1997).
264. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2004).
265. See supra Part IV.
266. Wynne, supra note 28, at 168.
267. Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 330, 787 P.2d 907, 913 (1990).
268. Id. at 330–31, 787 P.2d at 913 (“The first and second part of this test are often easily met by
challenged government action. The third part is a more difficult determination.”).
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In Robinson v. City of Seattle,269 the Washington State Supreme Court
invalidated the tenant relocation assistance provisions of Seattle’s former
HPO on substantive due process grounds.270 Without much analysis, the
court concluded that the ordinance advanced a legitimate public purpose
and employed reasonable means to achieve its goals.271 In employing the
third due process question—that of undue oppression, the court balanced
the following list of nonexclusive factors to weigh the City’s interests
against the Property owners’:
On the public’s side, the seriousness of the public problem, the
extent to which the owner’s land contributes to it, the degree to
which the proposed regulation solves it and the feasibility of less
oppressive solutions would all be relevant. On the owner’s side,
the amount and percentage of value loss, the extent of remaining
uses, past, present and future uses, temporary or permanent
nature of the regulation, the extent to which the owner should
have anticipated such regulation and how feasible it is for the
owner to alter present or currently planned uses.272
While agreeing that homelessness presented a serious problem, the court
questioned the extent to which a single owner’s land or property
contributes to the problem: “The problems of homelessness and a lack of
low income housing in Seattle are in part a function of how all Seattle
landowners are using their property.”273 The Robinson court ultimately
found the ordinance unduly oppressive to the landowners who had to
pay relocation costs for their tenants.274 The court insisted that the
decrease in affordable rental housing in the city was a burden that had to
be “shouldered commonly and not imposed on individual property
owners.”275
One year later, the Washington State Supreme Court used similar
reasoning in Guimont v. Clarke276 to hold that the Mobile Home
Relocation Assistance Act violated park owners’ substantive due process
rights.277 The Guimont court agreed that the regulation achieved a
legitimate public purpose of assisting mobile home park residents in the
269. 119 Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 318 (1992).
270. Id. at 55, 830 P.2d at 331.
271. Id. at 54, 830 P.2d at 330.
272. Id. at 55, 830 P.2d at 331 (quoting Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 331, 787 P.2d at 913).
273. Id. at 55, 830 P.2d at 331.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993).
277. Id. at 590, 854 P.2d at 3–4.

14 - Ennis Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

6/11/2013 5:03 PM

626

[Vol. 88:591

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

event of park closures.278 In applying the second part of the test, the
court asked whether it was reasonably necessary to require the assistance
be paid by the park owner, but then turned directly to Robinson’s “undue
oppression” balancing test to help answer that question.279 When
considering the factors on the “public’s side,” the Guimont court
acknowledged that the lack of low-income housing in Washington was a
serious problem.280 The court also admitted that closure of mobile home
parks contributed to the immediate need for relocation assistance.281 But,
the court placed the greater blame on the general unavailability of lowincome housing and not on the individual park owner who desired to
close his or her park.282 According to the court, the shifting of burdens
from society at large to the individual owners represented an oppressive
solution that should have been spread throughout society.283 On the
“owner’s side,” the Guimont court emphasized that relocation costs
could amount to “large sums of money,”284 and that the cost imposed by
the Act attached to the act of leaving the mobile home park business
rather than entering or simply conducting the business.285
In Laurel Park, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered
whether a zoning ordinance that limited the use of existing mobile home
parks was a violation of Washington’s substantive due process law.286
Like the Guimont court, the Laurel Park court moved quickly through
the first two steps of the analysis, concluding the ordinance used
reasonably necessary means to advance a legitimate public purpose.287
But the court did not find the ordinance unduly oppressive, even though
it acknowledged that the ordinance placed a public burden on individual
mobile home park owners.288 In weighing the list of nonexclusive
factors, the court concluded that the two most important factors were the
negligible present-day effect on the landowners’ property values, and the
278. Id. at 609–10, 854 P.2d at 14.
279. Id. at 610, 854 P.2d at 14 (citing Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 55, 830 P.2d
318, 331 (1992)).
280. Id. at 610, 854 P.2d at 15.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 611, 854 P.2d at 15.
285. Id. at 612, 854 P.2d at 16 (reasoning that imposing costs on entering business is less
oppressive because the landowner has the ability to avoid the cost).
286. Laurel Park Cmty., L.L.C. v. City of Tumwater, 698 F.3d 1180, 1193-95 (9th Cir. 2012). See
supra Part III.B.3 for discussion of the takings questions in Laurel Park.
287. Laurel Park Cmty., 698 F.3d at 1193–94.
288. Id. at 1194.
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fact that the owners could continue with existing operations of their
mobile home parks.289 The court emphasized that its conclusion was
based on the plaintiff’s facial challenge, and that if plaintiffs could show
a significant diminution in value of particular parcels of land, the
outcome may differ.290
VI. A MANDATORY SET-ASIDE ORDINANCE DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE A FEDERAL TAKING IF IT MEETS CERTAIN
CRITERIA
Mandatory set-asides do not impose a taking on landowners under the
per se takings test or under the Penn Central analysis so long as the
economic burden on landowners is not too great. Furthermore,
mandatory set-asides do not impose unconstitutional conditions on
developers if the set-aside program is developed pursuant to findings
that demonstrate a nexus between residential development and the need
for low-income housing. Finally, a mandatory set-aside program should
not be susceptible to a federal due process challenge unless it is
implemented in a way that is arbitrary, capricious, or prejudicial.
A.

Mandatory Set-Asides Do Not Amount to a Per Se Taking

Under the federal takings analysis, a mandatory set-aside ordinance
would not qualify as a per se taking unless it deprived a landowner of all
economically viable use or imposed a physical invasion of the
property.291 The U.S. Supreme Court held in Yee v. Escondido292 that a
rent control statute prohibiting the eviction of tenants is not a “physical
occupation” under the Loretto theory of per se takings.293 The Court has
also emphasized that physical appropriations are relatively rare and that
treating land-use regulations as per se takings “would transform
government regulation into a luxury that few governments could
afford.”294 Because a mandatory set-aside ordinance is nearly identical to
a rent control ordinance in terms of its physical effect on land owners, it
will not be classified as a per se taking based on a physical invasion of
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1194–95.
291. See supra Part III.A.1.
292. 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
293. Id. at 528–29, 532 (clarifying that rent control ordinances do not compel a physical
occupation; rather, they regulate the economic relations of landlords and tenants).
294. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323–24
(2002).
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property. Therefore, unless a mandatory set-aside program denies a
property owner of all economically viable use, the regulation will not be
a per se taking under the federal analysis.
B.

Mandatory Set-Asides Are Not a Taking under Penn Central Unless
They Go Too Far

An ordinance that survives a per se takings analysis must then be
considered under the Penn Central balancing test. A mandatory set-aside
ordinance must strike a balance to meet the needs of the community in a
way that does not impose excessive burdens on a developer. Under a
federal takings analysis, an ordinance must consider the economic
impact of regulations, interference with investment-backed expectations,
and the character of the government action.295 In large part, the outcome
of a Penn Central inquiry turns upon “the magnitude of a regulation’s
economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate
property interests.”296 So long as the economic impact of a mandatory
set-aside program is not too great, a court should find that mandatory
set-asides are permissible under the Penn Central tests.
1.

Economic Impact

As the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Laurel Park, a court will rarely
declare a regulation a taking based on economic impact alone.297 Unless
a mandatory set-aside ordinance devalues a landowner’s property by an
excessively large amount, other factors must be present.298 However, a
court will balance a demonstrated economic impact with other factors,
and a developer or landowner who shows clear evidence of a large
negative economic impact will have a better case for a takings claim.299
Of course, without evidence of negative economic impact, a landowner
would hardly have a case for a taking at all.

295. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977).
296. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2004).
297. Laurel Park Cmty., L.L.C. v. City of Tumwater, 698 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 2012).
298. See id. In Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the court held
a taking occurred based on the 96% loss of return on equity. Id. at 1343. However, the U.S.
Supreme Court has rejected takings claims where a regulation caused a 75% diminution in value,
see Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), and a 87.5% diminution in value, see
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
299. Laurel Park Cmty., 698 F.3d at 1189–90.
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Investment-Backed Expectations

When considering economic impact, a court will pay special attention
to whether a regulation interferes with a distinct investment-backed
expectation.300 In Penn Central, the Court emphasized that the New
York law in question did not interfere with investment-backed
expectations because it permitted Penn Central Station to not only profit
from the use of its property, but to also obtain “a reasonable return” on
its investment.301 Because mandatory set-aside regulations are imposed
on future housing developments, it will be difficult for a landowner to
show that a new regulation disrupts a discrete investment-backed
expectation unless the regulation deprives the owner of profitable use of
the property.
A landowner typically must show that his or her primary investment
expectation was disrupted by a regulation.302 In most instances, a
landowner’s primary expectation is that he or she will be able to
continue operating the property in its current condition.303 Property
owners do not have a right to develop their property based on
speculation about future market conditions.304 In the Ninth Circuit,
speculative prospects only amount to investment-backed expectations if
those speculations are probable enough to affect the land’s current
market price.305
Developers operate in a world of changing regulations that sometimes
impose new costs. When land is purchased, owners do not have a
perpetual right to develop land free from future regulation.306 Unless a
mandatory set-aside program is so costly to developers that their present
expectations are no longer profitable, its enforcement will not constitute
a taking. For example, consider a developer (D) who purchases land in a
multi-family residential district and the land has a current market price
that allows for the profitable development of 120 market-rate units at
300. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123.
301. Id. at 136.
302. Id.; Laurel Park Cmty., 698 F.3d at 1189–90.
303. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136; Laurel Park Cmty., 698 F.3d at 1189–90.
304. See Laurel Park Cmty., 698 F.3d at 1189–90.
305. Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2010).
306. Washington’s vested rights doctrine provides a contrast to this principle. A development
project will be considered “vested” on a specified date of filing a building permit or plat application
for the project, or through other processes provided by local ordinances. See WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 19.27.095, 58.17.033 (2012); W. Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash. 2d 47, 51, 720
P.2d 782, 785 (1986). Once developers’ rights are vested, they are protected from subsequent
changes to land use and zoning regulations. W. Main Assocs., 106 Wash. 2d at 51, 720 P.2d at 785.
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maximum density. If a city passes an ordinance that requires 50% of
housing units to be affordable and this makes D’s project unprofitable,
the city has disrupted D’s investment-backed expectation. If instead, the
ordinance requires 15% of the units to be affordable but still allows D to
make a reasonable return on the project, D’s investment-backed
expectations are unlikely to be disrupted.307 Finally, if the city provides
additional benefits to D—extra density allowances, expedited
permitting, reduced permitting costs, etc.—then the city is even more
protected against a claim that it disrupted D’s investment-backed
expectations.308
3.

Character of the Government Action

When a court evaluates the “character of a governmental action” it
will consider whether the action is more similar to an impermissible
physical invasion or instead resembles a public program that adjusts
“benefits and burdens” to promote the common good.309 A court should
determine that a properly-drafted mandatory set-aside ordinance is not a
taking under the third prong of Penn Central. While mandatory setasides have some bearing on legitimate property rights, i.e. the right to
rent to anyone, this restriction is not so severe that it resembles a
physical invasion. Rather, mandatory set-asides, like many zoning
regulations, operate to ensure an appropriate mix of land uses within a
community. In other words, they place minimal restrictions on some
housing developers in order to provide adequate housing for low and
moderate-income residents.
Like the historical preservation ordinance in Penn Central, a
mandatory set-aside ordinance applies broadly to land owners who meet
certain criteria.310 Also, a mandatory set-aside ordinance has the
advantage of spreading both burdens and benefits across a larger
segment of the population than the MHP ordinance in Laurel Park.311 Of

307. While D may personally believe that his or her investment-backed expectations have been
disrupted, a court is principally concerned with whether D’s present uses are disrupted and if D can
still make a reasonable return on investment. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136.
308. In Penn Central, the Court emphasized the landowners’ ability to transfer development
rights when determining that investment backed expectations were not disrupted. Id. at 137.
309. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2004).
310. In Penn Central, the historic preservation ordinance extended to all New York City
structures eligible for historic designation. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 133. Likewise, mandatory setaside ordinances typically apply to all landowners who seek to develop more than a specified
number of units. See IGLESIAS & LENTO, supra note 7, at 99.
311. See supra Part III.B.3
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course, private housing developers will bear the responsibility of
providing some amount of low-income housing to the population. But
government often places sector-specific regulatory burdens on various
industries as a means of promoting health, safety, and the general
welfare.312 And like the historic preservation ordinances in the Penn
Central case, or any number of restrictions on private property—
environmental regulations or zoning, for example—a number of
property owners will always be more severely impacted than others.313
Mandatory set-asides are regulatory programs that adjust benefits and
burdens for the benefit of all society. Residents generally benefit from
the reduction in traffic and pollution when low-income workers do not
have to travel long distances from the affordable outskirts of the city to
reach jobs in the city center. And all residents benefit from the inherent
value of allowing citizens of all walks and phases of life to live in
mixed-income communities. Asking all landowners who seek to develop
a certain quantity of housing to comply with a minimal affordability
obligation does not disproportionately and unconstitutionally burden a
small segment of the population. This is especially true when the city
mitigates the burden by providing incentives and rewards for doing so.
C.

Mandatory Set-Asides Are Not Unconstitutional Exactions under
Nollan and Dolan if They Are Supported by Proper Legislative
Findings

A mandatory set-aside program is constitutional under Nollan if the
jurisdiction implementing the program can demonstrate a nexus between
the conditions imposed on new developments and the jurisdiction’s
regulatory justification. Therefore, a city implementing a mandatory setaside program should produce findings that demonstrate a strong
correlation between the targeted residential developments and the need
for more affordable housing. Because Dolan demands that a required
dedication be roughly proportional “in nature and extent” to the impact
of the development,314 a city should be prepared to produce concrete
evidence of this proportionality, especially if the city faces an as-applied

312. See, e.g., Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 2, 104 Stat. 2353-57
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2006)) (requiring food manufacturers to place nutrition
and ingredient information on all food packaging); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and
Regulations, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (1966) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 3010130169 (2006)) (imposing numerous safety, efficiency, and other standards on car manufacturers).
313. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 133–34.
314. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 395 (1993).
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challenge.315 The Ninth Circuit held that a nexus was adequately
established in Commercial Builders when the city produced a study
showing the number of additional low-income workers a new
commercial development would generate, and the concomitant need for
additional housing to accommodate them.316 A Washington court should
follow this persuasive authority and uphold a mandatory set-aside
ordinance if a city implementing a mandatory set-aside program can
produce some reasonable evidence of the link between new residential
development and the displacement of low-income housing.317
If a mandatory set-aside ordinance is challenged in an as-applied
challenge, the city will carry the burden of demonstrating the proper
nexus and proportionality.318 However, if the City fails to meet its
burden, the plaintiff will not have to comply with the set-aside
requirements, but the ordinance itself will not be invalidated. If a
developer brings a facial exactions challenge, the burden should shift
back to the developer to prove the invalidity of a generally applicable
law.319 A city that produces findings showing the nexus between
development and the need for set-asides will have a much easier time
overcoming the Nollan and Dolan tests since such findings are entitled
to deference by the courts.320
Dolan offers a refinement of the Nollan test and requires that an

315. See supra Part III.C. For an as-applied challenge, the City carries the burden of proving
proportionality. Id.
316. Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 875 (9th. Cir. 1991).
317. See supra Part III.C. The Commercial Builders court did not require evidence of causation,
just of a substantial connection. Id.
318. See supra Part III.C.
319. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (distinguishing general, city-wide legislation from adjudicative
permit decisions). See also THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
REGULATION LAW § 10:5 (3d ed.) (taking their cue from Dolan’s emphasis on the fact that the case
involved an adjudicative decision, most courts have found heightened scrutiny inapplicable to
broad-based legislative conditions); Inna Reznik, Note, The Distinction Between Legislative and
Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242 (2000) (noting that where
property owners must bargain on a case by case basis, in what is essentially an adjudicatory setting,
the safeguards of the open legislative process are lost, and concern arises that the individual may be
compelled to give more than a fair share).
320. To date, Bainbridge Island, WA may be the only community in Washington that has
prepared a residential nexus report. See WASHINGTON REAL PROPERTY DESKBOOK SERIES: VOL. 5
LAND USE PLANNING, HOUSING § 10.7, 10–25 (4th ed. 2012). A number of California communities
have also compiled nexus reports for the impact of new residential housing on the loss of lowincome housing. See ADAM F. CRAY, THE USE OF RESIDENTIAL NEXUS ANALYSIS IN SUPPORT OF
CALIFORNIA’S INCLUSIONARY HOUSING ORDINANCES: A CRITICAL EVALUATION (Nov. 2011),
available
at
http://www.cbia.org/go/linkservid/06D3172D-35C3-4C71-9A9098D439C63874/
showMeta/0/.
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exaction be roughly proportional in nature and extent of the impact of
the proposed development.321 In the context of set-aside programs, a city
should ensure that it keeps its percentage requirements low enough that
it does not overburden developers. A city’s findings on the extent of the
connection between new residential development and a loss of lowincome housing will help inform what an appropriate requirement may
be. For smaller communities, findings on a citywide basis may be
appropriate. But in a larger city like Seattle, the best findings will be
those that demonstrate impacts within a particular neighborhood.
D.

Mandatory Set-Asides Should Not Be Susceptible to a Federal
Substantive Due Process Claim

After Lingle, the U.S. Supreme Court has removed all substantive due
process tests from its takings analysis.322 The Court renounced
substantive due process as the primary method for invalidating social
and economic legislation in the first half of the twentieth century.323
Therefore, except in unique circumstances, generally applied mandatory
set-aside legislation should not be vulnerable to a federal substantive due
process claim. However, the federal takings analysis does not subsume
all potential land use claims.324 There is still room for substantive due
process when, for example, a property owner claims that a land use
regulation was adopted for prejudicial reasons, that a development right
was denied in bad faith, or that a regulation lacked legitimate public
purpose.325 In such instances, the action may be held to violate
substantive due process on grounds of arbitrariness and no amount of
compensation would make such a regulation constitutional.326
But a typical mandatory set-aside program should not have too much
difficulty overcoming a federal substantive due process challenge. A
government effort to increase the supply of affordable housing, promote

321. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
322. See supra Part II.
323. Id. See also Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1318–19 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled on
other grounds by Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 856–57 (9th Cir.
2007) (recognizing that the “use of substantive due process to extend constitutional protection to
economic and property rights have been largely discredited”).
324. See supra Part II.
325. Id.
326. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005) (“[I]f a government action is
found to be impermissible—for instance because it fails to meet the ‘public use’ requirement or is
so arbitrary as to violate due process—that is the end of the inquiry. No amount of compensation
can authorize such action.”).
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mixed income neighborhoods, and increase housing near job sites is a
legitimate public purpose.327 As long as the program does not single out
a small number of landowners and instead is applied uniformly
throughout a city or neighborhood, it should not be deemed arbitrary or
prejudicial. Finally, an ordinance that allows for administrative relief if a
landowner can demonstrate that an ordinance is prejudicial or lacks a
reasonable relationship to the community’s need for affordable housing
should be protected from a facial substantive due process challenge.328
VII. EVEN UNDER WASHINGTON’S EXISTING TAKINGS
FRAMEWORK, MANDATORY SET-ASIDES CAN SURVIVE
A TAKINGS CHALLENGE
For the sake of simplicity and predictability,329 the Washington State
Supreme Court should abandon its unique takings analysis in favor of
the federal analysis.330 However, even if the court retains its present
analysis, it ought to find that a properly implemented mandatory setaside program does not constitute a taking or a substantive due process
violation. Part A explains why mandatory set-asides do not fail the first
threshold test, which asks if a regulation is a per se, or categorical
taking. While the plurality in Manufactured Housing articulated an
overreaching version of Washington’s unique “fundamental attribute
test,” even under that standard, mandatory set-asides do not derogate a
fundamental attribute of property ownership and thus are not per se
unconstitutional. Part B considers the second threshold test, which asks,
“does a regulation seek less to prevent a harm than to impose an
affirmative public benefit?,” and argues that mandatory set-asides both
prevent a harm and impose an affirmative benefit. Therefore, they may
be funneled into either the due process analysis or the takings analysis.
Part C analyzes the likely result if a mandatory set-aside ordinance is
327. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (deferring to legislative judgment and
holding that economic development constitutes a “public purpose”); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,
467 U.S. 229 (1984) (deferring to legislature and finding elimination of land oligopoly a legitimate
public purpose).
328. See supra text accompanying note 171.
329. From a practical perspective, the Washington test should be abandoned because it is
confusing. The Washington test is modeled on federal law, but introduces unique elements and
interpretations that muddle a relatively straightforward takings framework. See Wynne, supra note
28, at 129. Additionally, no one case contains the entire Washington takings analysis; instead,
elements must be pieced together from multiple cases. Id. at 134–35.
330. This argument is developed at length in Roger Wynne’s article, The Path Out of
Washington’s Takings Quagmire: The Case for Adopting the Federal Takings Analysis, supra note
28. Some of Wynne’s arguments are also summarized in the sections that follow.
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funneled into the takings framework and argues that mandatory setasides do “advance a legitimate state interest.” Finally, because of the
weaknesses of the substantive due process framework, Part D argues that
Washington should abandon its reliance on the doctrine in favor of the
federal takings analysis. Part D further argues that even if Washington
courts retain the current framework for evaluating land use regulations,
mandatory set-asides should survive both a takings and a due process
challenge.
A.

Mandatory Set-Asides Do Not Derogate a Fundamental Attribute
of Property Ownership and Do Not Amount to a Per Se Taking
under Washington’s First Threshold Question

As discussed in Part VI.A, a mandatory set-aside ordinance does not
constitute a physical occupation and would not deprive a landowner of
all economically viable use of his or her property. Therefore, it would
not amount to a per se taking under the first two per se takings tests.
Additionally, mandatory set-asides should not be considered a per se
taking under Washington’s third form of per se takings because
requiring limited set-asides of rental units does not derogate a
“fundamental attribute” of property ownership.331 The ordinance in
Manufactured Housing restricted the right to dispose of property by
selling to a person of the owner’s choice. Courts have emphasized a
landowner’s right to freely dispose of property,332 and if a mandatory
set-aside program is applied to owner-occupied housing, it may suffer
the same fate as the right-of-first-refusal statute in Manufactured
Housing.333 However, a program that only regulates rental activity limits
the right to exclude rather than the right to dispose of property. A
landowner who provides rental housing to the public does not have a
completely unrestrained right to exclude whomever he or she desires.334
Because most mandatory set-aside programs place only minimal
331. See supra Part.III.B.1 for discussion of Washington’s “fundamental attribute” test.
332. See, e.g., Laurel Park Cmty., L.L.C. v. City of Tumwater, 698 F.3d 1180, 1192 (9th Cir.
2012); Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. of Wash. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 364–66, 13 P.3d 183,
191–92 (2000).
333. AHIPA provides that incentive zoning programs may set guidelines for both renter or owner
occupancy housing. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.540(2)(b) (2012).
334. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.60.030, .222 (2012) (prohibiting exclusion of tenants
based on sex, marital status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, familial status,
veteran or military status, or disability); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 14.08 (2013) (prohibiting
tenant discrimination based on age or source of income). See also Manufactured/Mobile Home
Landlord-Tenant Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 59.20.080 (2012) (requiring landowners to terminate or
fail to renew a lease only with just cause).
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restrictions on the right to exclude, such programs are distinguishable
from the right of first refusal statute that was struck down in
Manufactured Housing.
If a Washington court follows the Manufactured Housing plurality’s
expansive interpretation of the “fundamental attribute” test,335 nearly any
regulation that negatively impacts a property right is a per se taking,
regardless of the social utility of the regulation and the intensity of the
burden placed on a property owner. As Justice Talmadge pointed out in
his dissenting opinion, all zoning laws could be abrogated under the test
since they interfere with an owner’s possession and use of property to
some extent.336 Under the plurality’s approach, a mandatory set-aside
program could be deemed a “derogation” of a fundamental attribute of
property ownership because it implicates the right to exclude tenants
based on income. However, the state already places limitations on
property rights in a myriad of permissible ways—for example by
prohibiting discrimination in housing practices,337 or by exercising its
police power to require building set-backs, height and density
restrictions, and even certain aesthetic criteria.338 A “fundamental
attribute test” that prohibits interference with core property rights but
that does not explain how to distinguish an impermissible interference
from typical zoning practices is unworkable and ripe for abuse. When
considering a mandatory set-aside program, a court should refrain from
such an expansive application of Manufactured Housing and rely instead
on the federal takings tests.339
B.

Mandatory Set-Asides Both Prevent a Social Harm and Provide an
Affirmative Public Benefit and May Be Analyzed under Either a
Due Process or a Takings Framework

The second threshold question—does a regulation “seek[] less to
prevent a harm than to impose on those regulated the requirement of
providing an affirmative public benefit”—is what allows Washington
courts to funnel potential takings claims into a substantive due process
analysis instead. A regulation that does not destroy a fundamental
attribute of property ownership and seeks only to protect the public
335. See supra Part IV.B.
336. Manufactured Hous., 142 Wash. 2d at 417, 13 P.3d at 218 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
337. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030 (2012).
338. See Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 56, 830 P.2d 318, 331 (1992).
339. For a more in-depth discussion of why the Washington State Supreme Court should abandon
the fundamental attribute test see Wynne, supra note 28, at 164–66.
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health, safety, and general welfare is not subject to a takings challenge
and is evaluated under due process law.340 But a regulation that “goes
beyond mere harm prevention to require a property owner to provide a
public benefit,” must be evaluated under the takings framework.341
Because the distinction between preventing harm and providing
affirmative benefits is unworkable, the Washington State Supreme Court
should eliminate this test from its analysis. Mandatory set-asides both
prevent a harm and provide an affirmative benefit. Therefore, a court
could easily funnel mandatory set-asides into a substantive due process
or a takings claim depending on the result desired.
The harm versus benefit dichotomy is particularly challenging in the
land use context where regulations often work to prevent a harm in order
to confer a benefit to another landowner, or to the broader community.342
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized this challenge in Lucas, where it
eliminated the harm-benefit test from its analysis, noting that the
distinction between a harm and benefit is “often in the eye of the
beholder.”343 To use the facts in Lucas as an example, imposing a
servitude on one landowner’s land may be necessary to prevent the
owner from harming the state’s ecological resources; alternatively, it
might achieve the benefits of creating an ecological preserve for the
state.344 Likewise, mandatory set-asides seek to mitigate the harm of new
residential developments driving out existing low and moderate-income
housing and/or excluding mixed-income housing options.345 At the same
time, mandatory set-asides provide a benefit to low and moderate
income residents who lack access to affordable housing, especially in
areas of the city that are closes to jobs and services.
As previously mentioned, Washington courts have often shielded
communities from the financial liabilities of a takings challenge by
analyzing land use regulations under the due process test.346 A city may
prefer this result in order to protect its financial resources. However, this
course of action also has the undesirable result of invalidating the
340. Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 50, 830 P.2d at 328.
341. Id.; see also Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 594, 854 P.2d 1, 6 (1993).
342. For example, imposing a servitude on one landowner’s land may be necessary to prevent the
owner from harming the state’s ecological resources, or it could help achieve the benefits of
creating an ecological preserve. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992).
343. Id. at 1024.
344. See id. at 1024–25.
345. This requirement reemphasizes the need for government findings on the impact of new
residential development on existing low-income and moderate housing. See Part VI.C. (calling for
residential nexus studies).
346. See supra note 192 and accompanying text; see also Wynne, supra note 28, at 154–55.
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ordinance in its entirety.347 A successful as-applied takings claim, on the
other hand, would require a municipality to award compensation to a
single developer, but would not invalidate the regulation out-right. This
result may be preferable in the context of a mandatory set-aside
program, since it would allow for the continuation of the program in the
event of a successful challenge, but would also provide for
compensation in circumstances where mandatory set-asides unfairly
impose a hardship on an individual landowner.
Regardless of which way a court comes out on the second threshold
question, mandatory set-asides should be able to survive either a takings
or a substantive due process challenge under the Washington
framework. Part C below argues that mandatory set-asides can pass the
takings prong of the Washington framework, while Part D.1 asserts
mandatory set-asides can survive the substantive due process prong.
Finally, Part D.2 argues that Washington should abandon its
overreliance on substantive due process and instead rely on the federal
takings framework.
C.

Mandatory Set-Asides Can Survive a Washington Takings
Challenge Because They Advance a Legitimate State Interest in
Providing Adequate Housing

As discussed in Part IV.C., when a claim makes its way through a
threshold analysis and into the takings analysis, a Washington court will
ask if a regulation “substantially advances a legitimate state interest”
before applying the Penn Central test.348 If Washington courts continue
to apply the substantially-advances inquiry,349 it should present little
threat to a mandatory set-aside ordinance. The Washington State
Supreme Court has applied the test leniently in the past, and determined
that both the Mobile Home Relocation Assistance Act in Guimont v.
Clarke and the HPO in Sintra I and Robinson substantially advanced a
legitimate state interest.350 Likewise, a Washington court should find that
a mandatory set-aside program advances a legitimate state interest,
especially in light of state requirements that municipalities provide
347. See Wynne, supra note 28, at 161.
348. See supra Part IV.C.
349. As mentioned in Part VI.D, the U.S. Supreme Court removed the “substantially advances”
formula from the Court’s substantive due process analysis in Lingle. Because the Washington State
Supreme Court adopted the “substantially advances” test directly from the federal takings analysis,
it too should extricate the test from its takings analysis at the next available opportunity.
350. See supra Part IV.C. Those courts focused more on the legitimacy of the state interest than
on whether the ordinance effectively advanced that interest.
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adequate housing to low and moderate-income residents.351
After applying the “substantially advances” test, a Washington court
will apply the federal Penn Central factors to determine if the
regulations constitute a regulatory taking.352 Because the tests are
identical, the result should be the same as described in Part VI.B, and a
Washington court should find that a mandatory set-aside requirement
that still allows developers a reasonable return on investment is safe
from a takings challenge.
D.

Mandatory Set-Aside Programs Can Still Survive Challenges under
the Existing Substantive Due Process Test, but Washington Courts
Should Abandon the Substantive Due Process Analysis for Land
Use Regulations

Under Washington’s existing substantive due process analysis, a
mandatory set-aside ordinance should be safe from a substantive due
process challenge. So long as a mandatory set-aside ordinance does not
impose excessive costs on developers and applies prospectively across a
large enough segment of the population, a court ought to hold that it
does not violate the substantive due process rights of landowners. Given
the flexibility of the substantive due process test, a Washington court
certainly could rely on substantive due process to invalidate a mandatory
set-aside ordinance. However, out of respect for the superior
policymaking capacity of legislative bodies and in furtherance of the
separation of powers, a Washington court ought to exercise restraint
before overturning important social and economic legislation.353 To that
end, the Washington State Supreme Court should abandon its
overreliance on substantive due process in the land use context and
conform to the federal standard as laid out in Lingle.354
1.

Mandatory Set-Asides Do Not Violate Substantive Due Process
under Washington’s Current Test

If a Washington court analyzes a mandatory set-aside ordinance under
a substantive due process analysis, it will ask: (1) whether the regulation
is aimed at achieving a legitimate public purpose; (2) whether it uses
351. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(2) (2012); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-196-410(2)(e)
(2012).
352. See supra Part III.C.
353. See Susan Boyd, A Doctrine Adrift: Land Use Regulation and the Substantive Due Process
of Lawton v. Steele in the Supreme Court of Washington, 74 WASH. L. REV. 69, 89 (1999).
354. See generally supra Part III.
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means that are reasonably necessary for achieving that purpose; and (3)
whether it is unduly oppressive to the land owner.355 The substantive due
process test should not present much of a hurdle to a jurisdiction
implementing a mandatory set-aside program. The Robinson, Sintra,
Guimont, and Laurel Park courts all agreed that the housing ordinances
at issue aimed to achieve a legitimate public purpose.356 Likewise, the
Washington State Supreme Court should have no problem determining
that a mandatory set-aside ordinance has a legitimate public purpose of
increasing the supply of affordable housing and supporting inclusive,
mixed-income communities.
The question of whether mandatory set-aside ordinances are
“reasonably necessary” to achieve the government’s public purpose is
more challenging and harkens back to the Lingle court’s warnings about
the judiciary substituting its own judgment for that of legislative and
administrative bodies.357 If a city or county desires to produce more
affordable housing, there certainly are other ways of doing so. For
example, the city potentially could impose a broad tax on all citizens and
build more public housing through housing authorities. The city could
also allocate additional public money to provide even more enticing
incentives for developers who voluntarily build affordable housing—for
example, cash incentives, a waiver of all or most development fees, or
the provision of public land. However, every municipality has to make
its own calculations about how to allocate limited resources, and judges
are not well-positioned to make judgments on the “reasonable necessity”
of various policy decisions.358 Perhaps in light of this challenge, the
Robinson, Sintra, Guimont, and Laurel Park courts all punted on the
“reasonably necessary” question and relied instead on the third
question.359
The final question of the substantive due process analysis—whether a
regulation is unduly oppressive to a landowner—requires a court to
consider a set of nonexclusive factors when balancing the public’s
interest against those of a regulated landowner.360 When considering the
factors on the “public side” of the oppressiveness test,361 the Guimont,
355. Presbytery of Seattle v. King Cnty., 114 Wash. 2d 320, 330, 787 P.2d 907, 913 (1990).
356. See supra Part IV.D.
357. See supra Part III.B.
358. See supra Part III.
359. See supra Part IV.D.
360. See id.
361. See id. The factors on the public side include the seriousness of the problem, the extent to
which the owner’s land contributes to it, the degree to which the proposed regulation solves it, and
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Robinson, and Sintra courts acknowledged that the lack of low-income
housing in Washington was a serious problem.362 However, the courts all
concluded that the shifting of burdens from society at large to individual
landowners represented an oppressive solution that should have been
spread throughout society.363 Mandatory set-aside programs will not
suffer from the same burden-shifting flaws as the previously invalidated
housing ordinances if a municipality can demonstrate that new
developments are driving out existing low-income housing options,
contributing to homelessness, or diluting the availability of mixedincome housing. Additionally, plenty of evidence supports the efficacy
of inclusionary zoning as a method of providing affordable housing in an
otherwise cost-prohibitive area.364 Thus, a court should give deference to
a jurisdiction’s legislative findings regarding the degree to which
mandatory set-asides mitigate the lack of affordable housing in the
community. Such findings should help a city overcome the relevant
factor on the “public side” of the oppressiveness test.
On the “owner’s side” of the oppression test,365 mandatory set-aside
programs do not suffer from the same weaknesses as previous housing
ordinances. A mandatory set-aside ordinance that imposes a minimal—
or at least reasonable—financial obligation on landowners does not have
the same economic effect as the burdensome ordinances of Sintra or
Guimont.366 This is even more true when the program rewards
the feasibility of less oppressive solutions. Id.
362. See supra Part IV.
363. Id.
364. See, e.g., Jenny Schuetz, Rachel Meltzer & Vicki Been, 31 Flavors of Inclusionary Zoning:
Comparing Policies From San Francisco, Washington, DC, and Suburban Boston, 75 J. AM. PLAN.
ASS’N 441 (2009). The authors used empirical evidence to analyze inclusionary zoning in three
regions and concluded that inclusionary zoning policies vary widely and have varying levels of
effectiveness depending on the structure of the program. For example, in the Washington, DC
metropolitan area, 15,252 units of affordable housing had been developed as of 2003 as a result of
inclusionary zoning. Id. at 451. In the San Francisco Bay Area, only 9154 units were produced due
to inclusionary zoning, approximately 2.3% of new units permitted. Id. According to the authors,
correlations in their data suggest that programs that offer density bonuses and exempt small
developments produced the most affordable units; however, more research must be done to
determine what program structure will be most effective in a given location. Id. at 453.
365. See supra Part IV.D. The factors on the owner’s side include the economic effect of the
regulation, the extent of available remaining uses for the property, the temporary or permanent
nature of the regulation, the extent to which an owner could anticipate the regulation, and the
owner’s ability to alter present or currently planned uses.
366. In Guimont v. Clarke, mobile home park owners were required to pay $7500 per tenant,
regardless of the tenant’s income level, simply to close their park. 121 Wash. 2d 586, 611–12, 854
P.2d 1, 15 (1993). Similarly, the ordinance under review in Sintra imposed a $218,000 low income
housing replacement fee on an owner attempting to develop a $670,000 warehouse. Sintra, Inc. v.
City of Seattle (Sintra I), 119 Wash. 2d 1, 22, 829 P.2d 765, 777 (1992).
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developers with lucrative development incentives. Furthermore, unlike
previous ordinances that imposed restrictions on landowners when
leaving their existing enterprises, a set-aside ordinance is imposed solely
on new developments. Thus, mandatory set-asides do not suffer from
being wholly unforeseeable to affected property owners, and they do not
place limits on a landowner’s current or planned use. Finally, under
AHIPA, a set-aside ordinance imposes a fifty-year affordability
requirement.367 The lack of permanence in the regulatory burden, along
with other mitigating factors on the “public” and “owner” side, should
help protect an ordinance from invalidity on substantive due process
grounds.
2.

Washington Should Abandon Its Overreliance on Substantive Due
Process in the Land Use Context

Washington should abandon its overreliance on substantive due
process and conform to the federal norm of relying on takings law as the
primary constitutional safeguard against burdensome land use
regulations. This would mean eliminating both the outdated Agins
“substantially advances a legitimate state interest” test,368 and
eliminating the “second threshold question,” which asks if a regulation
“seeks less to prevent a harm than to impose the requirement of
providing an affirmative public benefit.”369 Eliminating the due process
branch of Washington’s takings analysis would both simplify
Washington land use law and limit the role of courts in evaluating the
efficacy of various policy decisions.
The advantage of the substantive due process analysis, as articulated
in Orion and Sintra II, is that it shields local governments from financial
liability as required by a Fifth Amendment takings claim.370 But, as
Roger Wynne argues in his article on the Washington takings analysis,
funneling claims into the substantive due process analysis when a

367. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.540(2)(e) (2012).
368. See supra Part III.C.
369. See supra Part III.B.2.
370. See Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra II), 131 Wash. 2d 640, 689–90, 935 P.2d 555, 580
(1997) (citing Orion Corp v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 651, 747 P.2d 1062, 1078 (1987) (“If all
excessive regulations require just compensation, rather than invalidation, land-use decision makers,
who adopt regulations in a good faith attempt to prevent a public harm, will nevertheless be held
strictly liable for regulations that result in a taking. Undoubtedly, the specter of financial liability
will intimidate legislative bodies from making the difficult, but necessary choices presented
by . . . land-use problems. . . . Strict liability would not result for all excessive regulations, however,
under the approach developed in our own regulatory takings jurisprudence.”).
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landowner seeks compensation from a takings claim may lower the floor
of constitutional protections that are available to landowners.371
Additionally, the Washington State Supreme Court can ensure adequate
protection to landowners without relying on its less precise substantive
due process analysis, because Nollan and Dolan already protect
landowners from unconstitutional exactions and Penn Central shields
landowners from regulations that are overly oppressive.372
Finally, one of the most obvious shortcomings of substantive due
process is that the doctrine empowers courts to step into a policymaking
role and evaluate the efficacy and value of social and economic
legislation.373 The U.S. Supreme Court abandoned its reliance on
substantive due process for this reason long ago.374 And in Lingle, the
Court reaffirmed its commitment to evaluate land use claims under the
takings, rather than due process framework.375 The “substantially
advances” test presents an opportunity for a court to use its own
judgment of whether legislation actually furthers the interest it seeks to
advance.376 This kind of “means-end”377 analysis is best left to legislative
bodies. The Washington State Supreme Court has invalidated housing
ordinances on substantive due process grounds because of the Justices’
assessment that there was no causal connection between the developers’
actions and the lack of affordable housing in the community.378 If the
government meets its burden of showing the necessary causal
connection between a policy and a social ill, judges should not attempt
to impose their own social philosophies or personal opinions to overturn
important social and economic legislation.
CONCLUSION
Inclusionary zoning can be a valuable tool for local governments that
are trying to achieve affordable housing policy goals. AHIPA provides

371. Wynne, supra note 28, at 160–63.
372. See supra Part III.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005).
378. See, e.g., Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle (Sintra I), 119 Wash. 2d 1, 22, 829 P.2d 765, 777
(1992) (“Sintra’s property cannot be singled out as contributing to the problem of homelessness in
any pronounced way; the lack of low income housing was brought about by a great number of
economic and social causes which cannot be attributed to an individual parcel of property.”).
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authority for both voluntary and mandatory inclusionary zoning
programs and explicitly states that such programs do not violate RCW
82.02.020. AHIPA’s amendment to the tax preemption statute means
that Washington courts can no longer rely solely on San Telmo and R/L
Associates to invalidate low-housing ordinances that otherwise conform
with AHIPA. Consequently, constitutional theories, such as due process,
unconstitutional exactions, or takings may become the bases for new
challenges to inclusionary zoning ordinances. Washington courts have
applied a unique takings analysis to land use regulations and have relied
on substantive due process tests that the U.S. Supreme Court denounced
in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. The Washington State Supreme Court
should reject its prior takings framework in favor of the streamlined
federal approach and reserve the substantive due process doctrine for
rare circumstances. However, so long as a mandatory set-aside program
does not impose economic hardship on developers and is supported by
evidence of a nexus between development and the need for affordable
housing, it should be safe from a constitutional challenge under both the
Washington and federal constitutions.

